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 1 
Summary 
This essay covers the subject of foreign ownership restrictions in LLCs in 
UAE mainland. In the beginning the study will guide us through an 
overview of the incorporation process and recognized company structures, 
which further specifies the differences between free zone and mainland. 
Accordingly, the study narrows down to focus on mainland LLCs, where the 
49/51 rule, which restricts foreign investors to own more that 49% of a 
company in UAE mainland, will be presented. 
As the restriction on foreign ownership rights often results in conflicts 
between concerned shareholders, the paper investigates strategies to resolve 
such disputes. What we find is that conflicts between a foreign owner and a 
local owner usually origin in the ownership structure. The problem is to 
determine which is the “valid” structure: is it the registered structure 
(accordingly with the 49/51 rule)? Or, is it a different structure agreed in a 
separate contract, i.e. side agreement? Side agreements usually stand as an 
affirmation of trust to specify that the UAE shareholder is not in fact the real 
owner of 51% share capital but rather the agent holding the same for the 
benefit of the foreign shareholder. Several studies are included to provide 
diverse conclusions and perspectives on foreign ownership restrictions, and 
a significant passage through case law presents deliberations of side 
agreement’s “validity”.  
UAE’s legal development in terms of the New CCL and the Anti-Fronting 
Law is then identified and explained. While the New CCL aims to relax 
foreign ownership restrictions in certain sectors, the Anti-Fronting Law’s 
target is to prohibit side agreements. It is found that the UAE will face a 
period of thoughtfulness, as it is necessary to find a balance between the 
country’s intentions of attracting international capital whilst ensuring a 
central role for UAE nationals in the domestic economy.   
It is also discovered that prohibiting side agreements could have a rather 
harsh impact on minority shareholders, who often relies on such 
arrangements. This further strengthens the support against the adoption of 
the Anti-Fronting Law.  
Ultimately, the thesis will outline advantages and disadvantages while 
considering if foreign ownership structure should be restricted or relaxed in 
light of the two new laws and of side agreements. It is determined that the 
New CCL’s positive implications overtake the negative aspects. Side 
agreements are proven valuable tools, if it keeps all parties satisfied and 
reflects the true agreement. Evidentially, it is found that the there should be 
no adoption of the Concealment Law. Focus should lie on the New CCL, 
providing relaxed ownership structure toward foreign investors. Side 
agreements should instead be acknowledged along with the 49/51 rule in the 
New CCL. 
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats behandlar restriktioner för utländskt ägande i aktiebolag i 
Förenade Arab Emiraten (UAE). Till en början kommer studien att guida 
oss genom en översikt av bolagsetablering samt bolagsstrukturer i landet, 
vilket sedermera leder till att specificera skillnaderna mellan frizon och 
fastland. Följaktligen avgränsas studien för att snävare fokusera på 
aktiebolag i fastlandet. Här presenteras ”49/51 regeln”, vilken begränsar 
utländska investerare att äga mer än 49 % i ett sådant bolag. 
Eftersom en restriktion av utländsk äganderätt ofta resulterar i konflikter 
mellan berörda aktieägare, undersöks olika strategier för att lösa sådana 
tvister. Vad vi finner är att konflikter mellan en utländsk aktieägare och en 
lokal aktieägare ofta har sitt ursprung i just ägarstrukturen. Problemet är 
sålunda att avgöra vilken struktur som är den gällande: är det 
ägandestrukturen som har registrerats hos myndigheterna (i enlighet med 
49/51 regeln)? Eller, en annan, olik, struktur som överenskommits i ett 
separat kontrakt, dvs. sidoavtal? Sidoavtal mellan aktieägare i UAE utgör 
ofta en bekräftelse på att den lokala aktieägaren i själva verket inte är ägare 
till 51 % av aktiekapitalet, utan snarare en ”agent” innehavande samma 
ägandeandel till förmån för den utländska aktieägaren. Ett flertal studier 
analyseras och bidrar till olika perspektiv gällande äganderestriktioner och 
en betydande vandring genom rättspraxis presenterar diskussioner och 
beslut gällande sidoavtal. 
Följaktligen genomgår uppsatsen UAE:s rättsliga utveckling i förhållande 
till the New CCL och the Anti-Fronting Law. Medan the New CCL bland 
annat syftar till att minska restriktioner för utländskt ägande i vissa sektorer, 
är the Anti-Fronting Law:s mål att förbjuda sidoavtal kringgående 49/51 
regeln. Resultatet visar att det blir nödvändigt för UAE att, i ljuset av dessa 
två lagar, finna en balans mellan landets avsikt att attrahera internationellt 
kapital och samtidigt bevara en central roll för lokala medborgare i den 
inhemska ekonomin. Vidare framför studien att ett förbud mot sidoavtal, i 
syfte att undkomma 49/51 regeln, kan ha en relativt drastisk påverkan på 
minoritetsägare som ofta förlitar sig på sådana uppgörelser. Detta påvisar 
bland annat stöd emot antagandet av the Anti-Fronting Law, samt en positiv 
inställning till sidoavtalets existens. 
I slutändan utvärderas fördelar och nackdelar med restriktioner av utländskt 
ägande. Detta skildras i bemärkelsen av de två nya lagarna samt i betydelsen 
av sidoavtal. Vi finner att the New CCL:s positiva verkningar övertar de 
negativa aspekterna. Sidoavtal bevisas var en fungerande metod; om alla 
parter hålls nöjda samt om sådana avtal återspeglar den verkliga 
ägandestrukturen. Följaktligen resoneras att the Anti-Fronting Law inte bör 
implementeras. Fokus torde istället ligga på the New CCL som syftar till att 
minska restriktioner för utländskt ägande i vissa sektorer. Sidoavtal bör 
erkännas tillsammans med 49/51 regeln i the New CCL.  
 3 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis marks the end of my years as a student at the Faculty of Law at 
Lund University. It has been the best of times and the worst of times. 
The experience in Lund would never have been the same if I had not 
engaged myself in Gothenburg Nation and the Association of Foreign 
Affairs. I owe these organizations my sincerest gratitude, even though they 
kept me away from the library. 
I would like to extend my thankfulness to my tutor Henrik Norinder who 
has been most helpful during the course of this semester. It has been an 
honor to work with you.  
I am also indebted to my beloved partner Fredrik Bodin for his support 
during this thesis. 
At last, I would also like to thank my family and my friends who have been 
supporting me throughout these past years.  
 
 
August 7, 2013, Lund  
Anna Wallander 
 
 4 
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AED  Emirati Dirhams (UAE currency) 
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Jafza  Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority 
LLC  Limited Liability Company 
MOA                       Memorandum of Association 
UAE  United Arab Emirates 
US United States 
USD  United States Dollar 
 5 
1 Introduction  
Full foreign ownership of companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is 
only allowed in designated areas known as free zones that are designed to 
encourage foreign investments in the country.1 Outside these areas, ‘UAE 
mainland,’ all locally formed limited liability companies (LLC) must by 
law be owned by at least 51% (49/51 rule) by a UAE national or a locally 
owned entity.2 
Foreign investors in the UAE regularly circumvent the 49/51 rule by 
entering ‘side-agreements’ with local sponsors.3 These eliminate the 
powers and rights of the majority shareholders of a company leaving the 
foreign party as the ‘actual’ owner.4 The Dubai Court of Cassation has 
several times acknowledged side agreements upon documented proof, but a 
recent case by the Federal Supreme Court dismissed such arrangements, 
creating an uncertainty whether side agreements are legally permissible in 
the UAE.  
In 2004, the Federal Council of the UAE tried to prevent side agreements 
by introducing the Federal Law No. 17 (“the Anti-Fronting Law”) whose 
purpose it is to avoid all arrangements conflicting with UAE’s federal 
laws.5 But the adoption of the Anti-Fronting Law has been put on hold by 
the government, pending the implementation of a new Companies Law 
(New CCL),6 which aims to relax restrictions on foreign ownership 
structure. The New CCL is planned to be implemented by the end of 2013.7 
These legislative changes must balance the national and cultural concerns 
of the nation, such as to promote an increased role of Emirati nationals to 
partake in the country’s economy (the local citizens make up to less than a 
fifth of the population).8 This is supposed to uphold the recognition of the 
UAE’s culture as well as to build domestic know-how in line with the 
fundamental principles set forth in the UAE Vision 2021.9 
Accordingly, this study will analyze how the UAE government should 
move forward with these legislative changes as well as conflicting 
interests. The pressure for judicial transformation is tangible from several 
distinctive standpoints, and as time passes, concerned actors awaiting the 
legal reforms will increase the pressure on the authorities to speed up the 
legislative changes. 
                                                
1 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 50 f. 
2 UAE mainland is the territory that falls outside the free zones, Noor and Anani (2012a). 
3 Side agreements are contracts between a company’s related shareholders, often internally 
referred to on top of the registered MOA, Hadef & Partners. (2010). 
4 Khodeir and Wallaman (2010). 
5 Smith (2010). 
6 Amendment to Federal Law No (8) of 1984. 
7 Al-Shukairy (2013). 
8 World Bank (2013). 
9 UAE Vision 2021; Williams (2011). 
 6 
1.1 Background 
Forty years ago the UAE was one of the least developed nations of the 
world. Today, it has reached an income level equivalent to that of the 
industrialized nations, without passing through the hypothetical progress 
“stages” that most developed countries have faced.10 Since its formation in 
1971, the country has witnessed dramatic changes using the revenues from 
its oil and gas production to finance major infrastructural developments. As 
a result, the nation has become a major business hub in the Middle East.11  
In the wake of the financial crisis, foreign direct investments (FDI) 
collapsed in 2007 and declined steadily until 2009.12 Despite offering a tax-
free business environment and an excellent physical infrastructure, the UAE 
has fallen behind in its plans to liberalize the economy. However, recent 
government initiatives, e.g. economic policy reforms, modernized foreign 
investment regulations, and a multicultural lifestyle, have resulted in 
economic growth. These schemes are thus anew contributing to attract FDI 
according to the country’s ambitions.13  
Knowing how quickly, in its relatively short history, the UAE has 
developed its business environment; it makes sense that the legal 
framework has not yet progressed as far. The result is a nation highly 
attractive for foreign investors, but with poor legal security, often related to 
the 49/51 rule.14  
1.2 Research Objective 
This thesis examines foreign ownership restrictions of LLCs in UAE 
mainland. The purpose is to investigate these restrictions in the light of side 
agreements, the Anti-Fronting Law and the New CCL. The idea is to 
balance the demand for a relaxed ownership structure with the intention of 
prohibiting side agreements and thus activating UAE nationals.  
In order to take a position, three questions set forth to respond within this 
project: 
• Main Question: Should the foreign ownership structure be relaxed or 
constrained in the UAE?  
• Sub Question 1: How can a balance be found between the need to 
stay nationalized and the goal to attract foreign investors?  
• Sub Question 2: What are the advantages of side agreements and 
should they be legally recognized in respect to ownership structures?  
                                                
10 Shihab (1997) p 249. 
11 Zayed University. 
12 Hasan (2010) p 50 f. 
13 Hasan (2010) p 48 f., 53 f. 
14 Ahnish (2012). 
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The main question is comparing advantages and disadvantages with the 
current foreign ownership restrictions in UAE mainland. It is taking into 
considerations the new legal reforms and habitual strategies of setting up a 
business in this area. The first sub question is looking into the balance 
between the country’s aim of turning into a globally recognized business 
hub and thus attracting of FDI and the strive to remain nationalized by for 
example forcing private entities to entitle national Emiratis to a certain 
percentage of the employees. Finally, the second sub question takes notion 
on side agreements as whether or not they should be legally recognized. It 
will be discussed based upon the two former questions, both from the 
UAE’s perspective and from foreign investors standpoint.  
1.3 Methodology and Data 
In order to meet the purpose of the thesis, the traditional legal dogmatic 
method is employed, which entails the description and analysis of different 
sources of law.15 In this case, descriptions of the domestic laws and national 
case law will be used, which ranges from acts of primary and secondary law 
to the case law of the UAE Federal Supreme Court as well as the Dubai 
Court of Cassation. The principal case in this study, by the Federal Supreme 
Court, is designated “Case X” as a result of its unofficial stipulation.16 
Despite its standing, Case X has a central impact on this research as it 
contributes heavily to the discussion on side agreements.  
To answer the questions presented in 1.2; this study further analyzes trade 
and investment data, which can be related to the UAE Federal Laws and the 
CCL in particular. Relevant reports and articles, mainly gathered from 
online databases, will be searched and applied throughout the study and 
references will be visibly marked when necessary. Four interviews have 
been carried out to fulfill the gaps whenever needed material has been 
inaccessible. 
Since law firms have played a crucial role in the development of the 
country’s legal system, they are an effective source in this study. Legal 
firms were the ones who first met with the foreign investors, recognized 
their needs and developed judicial solutions. The courts have learned and 
advanced from experienced lawyers coming to Dubai from all over the 
world.17 Hence, information from the most prominent and well-established 
local law firms, known for being reliable and English-friendly, is central. 
The dependence on legal firms is furthermore a result of the deficiency of 
accessible material. Extensive discussions are limited and the developing 
stage creates a somewhat innovative situation. For instance, legal reforms 
established long ago in the West are not even on the agenda in the UAE 
                                                
15 The legal-dogmatic method applies ”within specialist analyses carried out in various 
areas of law”, Stelmach and Brozek (2006) p 9. 
16 Qudah (2013). 
17 Matthews (2013). 
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until recently, such as the soon-to-be-implemented Competition Law.18 The 
reader should know that there are hardly any existing studies in the 
academic literature on the effect of ownership requirements in the UAE.19  
Besides the area of law, the thesis also provides an economic approach to 
justify the legal development on foreign ownership structure in respect to 
UAE’s economic progress. This is considered from both the foreign 
investors’ and the UAE’s perspective. 
In order to have a clear picture of free zones v mainland, two supplementary 
documents will fill out the end of the study. Appendix A demonstrates a 
tablet of the recognized company structures, by the CCL, in UAE mainland. 
It also includes the branch and representative structures, which are not 
considered independent legal entities, but foreign investors frequently adopt 
them. Appendix B shows a list of all free zones in the UAE. It is distinctly 
showcasing that most free zones are based in Dubai, which has its origin in 
the Emirate’s strive to be a global business hub.20  In addition, there is also 
Appendix C, which explains why Case X cannot be named officially.  
1.4 Delimitations 
The legal changes in respect to the foreign ownership structure in this study 
concerns first and foremost LLCs. The discussion will only encompass other 
company structures initially and when relevant.  
Naturally, the CCL will be of particular interest since it directly relates to 
FDI in UAE mainland. The Civil Code among other laws will therefore be 
mentioned only to a limited extent. 
I will only study the foreign ownership structure in the UAE. It might be of 
interest to compare with other countries, but because the already extensive 
discussion within the UAE, the study could potentially be disorganized in a 
comparative research. 
For the sake of clarity, the amendments of the CCL and the Anti-Fronting 
Law are not yet implemented, but will be discussed as if they are to be 
adopted. Even though there is no decided framework over the Articles in the 
amended CCL, it will be speculated to the same extent as other 
organizations, law firms and institutions grasp it.21  
Moreover, there is an undoubted limitation of sources in regards to this 
subject. First there is the language barrier: despite that many translations are 
being made, translations are often not in exact harmony with the original 
                                                
18 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2013) p 2.  
19 Azzam and Rettab (2011) p 16. 
20 Zayed University. 
21 Ahnish (2012). 
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Arabic scripts. Hence, it is crucial to be observant with translated laws.22 
Another reason is the age of the country, which leaves us with limited 
sources of material i.e. research work and legal praxis.23 Therefore, I have 
primarily focused on analyzing the Articles in relevant laws. I have also 
received a lot of help from legal firms in the UAE, both from their published 
articles and through interviews. In addition, official numbers and figures are 
not unusually being scrambled and thus it is crucial not to push too much 
gravity on official numbers and instead consider them with precaution. 
Finally, despite the importance of licensing in accordance with the 
incorporation process in the UAE, I will not refer to discuss this, as it tends 
to remove focus from foreign ownership structure.  
1.5 Outline of study 
This first chapter’s introduction is followed by an overview of the 
incorporation process in the UAE, as well as the recognized company 
structures, which further specifies the differences between free zone and 
mainland.  
The third section examines the concept of foreign ownership structure 
focusing on the restrictions, particularly the 49/51 rule. Interviews have 
been integrated to understand the strategies of how to overcome investors’ 
disagreement and thus enhance shareholders cooperation in terms of side 
agreements. Several studies providing distinct conclusions are also included 
to stimulate the discussion and a passage through significant case law is 
being carried out. 
In the fourth section, UAE’s legal development in terms of the New CCL 
and the Anti-Fronting Law is identified and explained. The chapter provides 
an analysis on the balance between the potential legal reforms and scenarios 
where the laws will be implemented. 
Section five describes the affect on minority shareholders as an outcome 
from the Anti-Fronting Law or any elimination on side agreements. 
Disputes between shareholders are emphasized on the background of Case 
X and an examination on the possibility to remove a minority shareholder is 
especially in focus. 
The last section includes an analysis in regards to section 2-5 concentrating 
on the pros and cons with the adoption of aforementioned laws. The analysis 
intensely focuses on side agreements to investigate if such arrangements 
should be a part of UAE’s legal development of foreign ownership 
structures. Most importantly, the analysis will take into consideration the 
three decided research questions trying to emphasize them as much as 
possible, and lastly my conclusions. 
                                                
22 Huda (2013). 
23 Azzam and Rettab (2011) p 16.  
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2 The Incorporation Process 
2.1 Introduction 
Among all jurisdictions, market economies in particular, business 
corporations have a fundamentally similar set of legal characteristics, which 
respond to the economic exigencies of the large modern corporation. These 
are: legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated 
management under a board structure, and investor ownership. Together they 
make the entity exceptionally attractive for organizing productive activity.24  
All jurisdictions in well-developed economies have at least one core statute 
that establishes a basic corporate form with these five characteristics, 
usually and particularly to permit the formation of public corporations. For 
example, the French SARL, the German GmbH, or the American close 
corporation and limited liability company.25  
The commercial company law in the UAE, the CCL, follows the theory of 
the legal personality of a company26 and regulate the transfer of rights and 
obligations of shareholders.27 It further recognizes the limited liabilities 
form,28 delegate management under a board structure,29 and permit investor 
ownership.30 However the CCL does not recognize the concept of 
authorized but unissued shares, which is the case in many other 
jurisdictions.31 This makes the UAE’s limited liability company a “partial 
corporate form”, which can be used to form business corporations with all 
the five characters, though some by contract.32  
Moreover, regarding the nature and number of corporate shareholders, it 
differs noticeably even among the most developed economies, which leaves 
a flagrant mark on the structure of corporate law. For example, in the US, 
many publicly traded companies have dispersed share ownership (e.g. no 
single shareholder).33 In the UAE, in contrast, firms with publicly traded 
shares have a controlling shareholder (LLCs in UAE mainland, Article 22 
of the CCL).  
                                                
24 Kraakman and Armour with others (2009) p 5-6. 
25 Kraakman and Armour with others (2009) p 16-17. 
26 Once an LLC is registered in the Commercial Register, it will be considered an 
independent legal entity with corporate personality distinct from the shareholders. It will: 
have separate financial capacity, have the capacity to conduct its business within statutory 
limits and the ambit of its memorandum of association, and be able to sue and be sued in its 
own name (Article 12, CCL). In addition, a shareholder will be liable only to the extent of 
its share in the capital of the LLC, Article 218, CCL. 
27 Articles 218, 221 and 222, CCL; Al-Hemyari (2012) p 99-100. 
28 Articles 21 and 219, CCL. 
29 Article 235, CCL. 
30 Articles 17 and 22, CCL. 
31 Articles 218, 221 and 222, CCL. 
32 Kraakman and Armour with others (2009) p 17. 
33 Kraakman and Armour with others (2009) p 29. 
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Despite which form of corporate law a country relies on, the objective stays 
the same; to serve the interests of society as a whole. In other words, “to 
advance the aggregate welfare of all affected by a company’s actions,” 
including: shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and third parties 
(e.g. banks, local communities and beneficiaries of relevant environment).34 
2.2 UAE’s Legal Environment 
The UAE is a federation of Seven Emirates, each governed by an inherited 
emir, who chooses one of their members to be the leader of the federation.35 
The country is ruled both by federal laws (e.g. the CCL and the Civil Code), 
and by local laws determined by each Emirate. The federal laws have 
supremacy over the laws of the individual emirates.36 A comparison can be 
drawn to the federation of the United States (US).37  
The country’s jurisdiction is based on Civil Law. It has been deeply 
influenced by the Egyptian legal system, which has its roots in French and 
Roman law. Islamic law, which is codified in the Shari’ah, is applied in 
family courts but is less evident in the commercial scope. The increasing 
presence of international companies from common law countries 
(particularly the United Kingdom and the US) has led to influences from 
common law codes in the commercial judiciary.38 For instance, rulings by 
the UAE Federal Supreme Court may be useful for courts when judging in 
comparable cases; however, there is no doctrine of binding practices or stare 
decisis "to stand by things decided".39  
In addition, The UAE Constitution permits each Emirate to have its own 
legislature, judges and courts.40 All Emirates except Dubai and Ras Al 
Khaimah have chosen to operate their courts according to the uniform 
federal model (federal courts). Consequently, the Dubai Court of Cassation, 
which is the third and superior degree of litigation in the Emirate of Dubai’s 
judicial system, provides the same affect as the Federal Supreme Court.41  
It is relevant to mention the UAE Civil Code, as it will be reflected later in 
the thesis.42 Entities formed under the Civil Code are limited to carrying out 
                                                
34 Kraakman and Armour with others (2009) p 28. 
35 Hermansson (2013). 
36 Nishimura & Asahi. (2011) p 1. 
37 “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding”, U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2. 
38 Nishimura & Asahi (2011) p 1. 
39 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 20.  
40 Nishimura & Asahi (2011) p 1; Articles 121, 122 of the UAE Constitution. 
41 Articles 173-188 of the Civil Procedures Law No. (11) of 1992, Law No. (3) of 1992 on 
the Formation of the Courts in Dubai, Federal Law No. (30) of 2005, amendment to Civil 
Procedure Code of 1992, Government of Dubai (Dubai Courts). 
42 Federal Law No. (5) of 1985 on Civil Transactions; Zurich General Insurance (2013) p 
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“non-commercial” or civil activities: for example, the practice of law, 
medicine and research activities.43 The Civil Code is considered the father 
of laws in the UAE and will apply both when there is no specific legislation 
to the contrary, and when specific legislation is silent on a point of issue.44 
However, the Civil Code is rarely used in relation to foreign establishments 
and ownership structures,45 as these cases primarily are subject to the 
CCL.46  
The CCL set forth provisions governing conversion, merger and dissolution 
of companies. The law’s most relevant provision in respect to this study is 
the 49/51 rule,47 which for long has been an obstacle for foreign investors 
seeking to establish in the UAE. To solve this issue, the government has 
inter alia setup free zones around the country, mainly in Dubai, where 
foreign entities may establish with 100% ownership rights.48  
It is necessary to divide free zones from mainland. In contrast to mainland 
where companies act under the federal laws and the CCL, companies within 
the free zones are not bound by the CCL. Instead, such regulations are 
enacted by each free zone. The only exception is the Dubai International 
Financial Center (DIFC), which has its own labor and civil laws.49 The 
DIFC is an arrangement between the federal UAE authorities and the local 
authorities of the emirate of Dubai. According to this arrangement, the 
federal authorities agreed to discharge the DIFC from being subject to the 
federal civil and commercial laws.50 As a result, the DIFC is the only free 
zone in the UAE settled from federal laws. Later we will see how the DIFC 
differ from other free zones and how its judiciary is set up.   
                                                                                                                        
787; The UAE Civil Code, promulgated in 1985, adopted a different classification of 
companies than the Companies Law. “It provide for: “1 Work Companies: companies 
where two or more partners join together to perform specific work, 2 Persons' Companies: 
two or more persons join together to purchase goods on credit based on goodwill and 
reputation to sell such goods for a profit, 3 Speculative (Mudharaba) Companies: 
companies in which a person lends capital to another to carry out speculative business.” 
The main difference between civil and commercial companies depends on the intention to 
trade and can be compared to the distinction made between a 'merchant' and 'investor', 
Mahmoud (2008) p 2 f. 
43 "The attached Law shall have effect in respect of civil transactions in the State of the 
United Arab Emirates," Federal Law No. (5) of 1985; Business Laws of the United Arab 
Emirates (1987) p 2 ff.  
44 Business Laws of the United Arab Emirates (1987) p 1 f. 
45 Zurich General Insurance (2013) p 787. 
46 Lester and O’Keefe (2011) p 3. 
47 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 33-34; 
"Observing that certain commercial activities are confined to nationals as provided in this 
law or in any other Law, every company incorporated in the state must have one or more 
nationals whose share in the company capital must not be less than (51%) of the company 
capital", Article 22 CCL. 
48 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 50 ff.; Free 
Zones are part of the country’s territories but considered to be outside the customs territory 
and subject to customs control other than normal customs procedures, Department of 
Economic Development.  
49 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 30. 
50 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 25. 
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Another exemption from the 49/51 rule is granted to nationals of the states 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council "GCC" (the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Sultanate 
of Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain).51 As an example, the UAE Federal 
Law no (2) of 1989 permits citizens of the GCC to conduct wholesale trade 
or industrial operations in the UAE without an Emirati partner. Yet, if the 
investor is a juridical person, it must be in the form of a company owned not 
less than 51% by UAE nationals.52 
2.3 Company Structures 
To understand foreign ownership structure in the UAE, it is necessary to 
analyze which incorporation structures that are available, both in free zones 
and in mainland. Several laws collectively address these business 
configurations, yet the most prominent to foreign investors establishing in 
mainland is the CCL under Federal Law No (8) of 1984.53  
2.3.1 Establishing in Mainland  
The table in Appendix A shows the major differences between company 
structures recognized under the provisions of the CCL. Of the seven entities 
listed, the majority of foreign businesses in mainland UAE choose to 
incorporate under the LLC structure as foreigners can exert significant 
control and because it requires a relatively small capital investment.54 This 
is furthermore the reason why we have chosen to focus on LLCs.  
LLC 
In an LLC, shares should be distributed among all partners, maximum fifty 
and minimum two.55 The objects should be specified in the Memorandum of 
Association (MOA).56 It may contain any form of legitimate business, with 
the exception of insurance, banking, and investment of funds belonging to 
others.57  
Despite the fact that a local partner must hold the majority shares in an LLC 
(49/51 rule),58 a foreign partner can exercise absolute control over 
management decisions as long as it is stipulated in the MOA, either by 
                                                
51 The Gulf Cooperation Council "GCC" signed the United Economic Agreement in Riyadh 
on 7 June 1981 (endorsed by the UAE in 1982), in order to harmonize and unify economic, 
financial, monetary, commercial and industrial legislations. According to article 4 of the 
GCC Charter, the ambition is deepening and strengthening of relations, links and areas of 
cooperation among their citizens.  
52 Federal Law No. 2 of 1989; Al Tamimi & Company (2009) p 17. 
53 Zurich General Insurance (2013) p 786. 
54 Nishimura & Asahi (2011) p 9 ff.  
55 Article 218 CCL. 
56 Article 223 CCL. 
57 Article 220 CCL. 
58 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 33-34. 
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himself or through the appointed representatives,59 which is one of the most 
central reasons why this structure is the preferred choice among foreign 
investors:  
Article 237, CCL 
“Unless the powers of the manger are fixed in the company Memorandum 
of Association, the company manager shall have full powers to carry out 
management affairs of the company, and his actions shall be binding on the 
company, provided that they are substantiated by the capacity under which 
he acts.” 
In addition, the proportion of profits and losses to be shared can be agreed 
separately by the partners, and do not have to reflect the proportion of the 
capital contribution (up to 80% to the foreign investor holding 49% of the 
shares).60 Furthermore, if the UAE shareholder is an ineffective partner, 
ownership benefits might be circumvented through side agreements 
reflecting the “actual” ownership by the foreign shareholder. Such 
agreements can be recognized as a declaration of trust to specify that the 
UAE shareholder is not actually the real owner of the 51% share capital but 
instead the “agent” holding this percentage for the benefit of the foreign 
shareholder.61   
Even if side agreements are not registered with any authority and not 
recognized by the CCL, the courts may acknowledge them. For example, 
the Dubai Court of Cassation in Case No. 2008/212 ruled that the ownership 
structure in a side agreements can be recognized as the “actual” structure 
between a company’s shareholders, if the agreement is documented and can 
be introduced into evidence.62 Although, a recent case dismissed such 
arrangements, creating an uncertainty as to if side agreements are legally 
permissible on LLC’s in the UAE.63 The method of circumventing CCL’s 
required ownership structure through side agreements is a crucial and highly 
vibrant topic in the ongoing developments of the UAE legal system. 
Therefore we will come back to elaborate on this in chapter 3. 
The only way to legally circumvent the required ownership structure, if you 
are not a citizen of the GCC, is by establishing in a free zone.64 In 1998, the 
                                                
59 The manager shall have full authority to manage the Company and his actions shall be 
binding on the Company unless specific limitations are imposed, Articles 235, 237 CCL. 
60 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 37; “There is 
no law with respect to the maximum amount of profits that a local entity may distribute to a 
foreign shareholder. However, as a matter of local practice, the foreign shareholder may 
receive up to 85 per cent of the profits of a company incorporated in Abu Dhabi and the 
foreign shareholder may receive up to 80 per cent of the profits of a company incorporated 
in Dubai”, Lester and O’Keefe (2011) p 13. 
61 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 37-38. 
62 Case No. 2008/212. 
63 Case X. 
64 There are around 20 free zones in Dubai alone, six in Abu Dhabi, two each in Ras Al 
Khaimah, Fujairah and Sharjah, and one each in Ajman and Umm Al Quwain. The number 
of free zones in Dubai dwarfs that of Abu Dhabi, Dore (2012) p 73; An independent Free 
Zone Authority governs each free zone, and is the agency responsible for issuing the free 
 15 
UAE Federal Law no (15) of 1998 amended the CCL with respect to 
companies established in the free zones,65 stating that: “the UAE Free Zone 
Regulations may have their own Companies Law.” For this purpose, the 
CCL and the free zone regulations contain conflicting provisions on several 
matters.66 The most flagrant example is reflected in Article 22 of the CCL, 
saying that UAE nationals must own not less than 51% of a company, while 
in a free zone foreign investors assume 100% ownership of the registered 
entity and do not have to deal with a local partner.67  
Article 22, CCL 
Without prejudice to commercial activities reserved only to nationals, as 
may be prescribed herein or in any other law, it is a requirement for the 
establishment of a company to have one or more national partner(s) whose 
share in the company's capital is not less than 51%. 
2.3.2 Establishing in Free Zones 
The “free zone strategy”, which offers full foreign ownership of companies 
in a tax-free environment, attracts multinationals to incorporate in the 
UAE.68 The free zones are independent geographical and jurisdictional areas 
located around the UAE.69 Most of them exist within the Emirate of Dubai, 
which is a result of Dubai’s strategy to attract foreign investment and to 
become a regional business hub. Abu Dhabi, estimated to have control over 
90 % of the country’s oil resources have chosen not to invest in free zones 
as heavily.70 See Appendix B for a list over all free zones in the UAE.  
In contrast to the seven recognized company structures by the CCL in UAE 
mainland, free zones usually recognize three forms of establishment: (1) a 
branch office of a foreign principal company; (2) a Free Zone Establishment 
(independent legal entity with the foreign principal company or individual 
being the only shareholders); or (3) a Free Zone Company (similar to a Free 
Zone Establishment but with multiple shareholding).71 The major benefits 
with establishing in a free zone are as follows:  
- 100% foreign ownership  
- 100% import and export tax exemptions 
- 100% repatriation of capital and profits 
- No corporate taxes  
                                                                                                                        
zone operating licenses and assisting companies with establishing their business in the 
FTZ, Nishimura & Asahi (2011) p 4. 
65 Federal Law no 15 of 1998. 
66 Nishimura & Asahi (2011) p 51. 
67 Zurich General Insurance (2013) p 786. 
68 Nishimura & Asahi (2011) p 29-30. 
69 Zurich General Insurance (2013) p 786. 
70 Zayed University. 
71 Nishimura & Asahi (2011) p 4-5. 
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- No personal income taxes.72 
The free zones are moreover divided into different sectors. For example, 
Dubai Media City focuses on licensing companies to undertake media 
related activities, and Dubai Healthcare City focuses on healthcare and life 
science related companies and organizations.73 Each one has its own laws 
and regulations independently from the Federal Companies Law (CCL).74 
What they all have in common though is the allowance for foreign entities 
to establish without any involvement of UAE nationals.75  
Nevertheless, an incorporated company in a free zone can only trade inside 
the free zone or internationally. If a free zone company wishes to sell a 
product to a company in UAE mainland, it must appoint a distributor or an 
agent to transport the gods from the free zone to the end customer.76 For 
example, the Swedish-American water technology provider “Xylem” is 
established in UAE’s largest free zone “Jebel Ali.”77 Xylem has its regional 
office in Jebel Ali and appointed distributors in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar in order to conduct business in these countries.78  
As we can see, the opportunity to establish a legal presence in one of the 
free zones carries several economical advantages attracting foreign investors 
to the UAE, and perhaps the most sovereign of them all is the DIFC. 
DIFC 
The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) is an “onshore” financial 
centre.79 Unlike other free zones that are only independent from the CCL, 
the DIFC has a significant number of its own laws. For example, it has its 
own court system, its own stock exchange and a separate financial 
regulatory authority known as the Dubai Financial Services Authority 
(DFSA).80 Entities formed within the DIFC are subject to a notably different 
legal and regulatory regime than those formed in other free zones.81 
Moreover, the laws inside the DIFC, which are principle-based (i.e. under a 
common law system), are modeled on the best practices of the world’s 
major financial jurisdictions.82  
The financial free zone has two distinct characteristics. First of all, it is a 
                                                
72 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 50-51. 
73 Zurich General Insurance (2013) p 786; Dubai Media City; Dubai Healthcare City. 
74 Federal Law No. (8) of 1984. 
75 Zurich General Insurance (2013) p 786. 
76 Rao (2000) p 255 f.; Dore (2012) p 73. 
77 Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority (Jafza) was established in 1985 and is today one of the 
world’s largest free zones, spread over an area of 48 sq. kms and is home to over 6400 
companies, Jebel Ali Free Zone. 
78 Hermansson (2013). 
79 DIFC. 
80 DIFC’s international stock exchange, NASDAQ Dubai, is “a trading platform for 
structured financial products and, most recently, equity derivatives”, Tarbuck and Lester 
(2009) p 12 ff. 
81 Nishimura & Asahi (2011) p 25, 43 ff.; Zurich General Insurance (2013) p 787. 
82 DIFC. 
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geographical zone, i.e. like all other free zones it has to exist in a particular 
area where the companies’ activities must be conducted.83 Another example 
of this geocentric emphasis is the requirement to physically exist within the 
boundaries of the free zone.84 The second character belongs to the activities 
carried out in the DIFC. They are exclusively financial activities.85  
Additionally, the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts is limited to disputes 
where a DIFC company is a party, or to disputes arising out of a transaction 
carried out in the DIFC.86 The courts shall have jurisdiction over “civil or 
commercial cases and disputes involving the Centre or any of the Centre’s 
Bodies or any of the Centre’s Establishments”.87 As a result, the DIFC 
Courts can neither accommodate claims not involving the DIFC entities, nor 
non-financial claims.88  
The difference between incorporating in a free zone and in mainland is 
central for foreign investors seeking to establish in the UAE, particularly in 
respect to requirements on ownership structure. We now know that 
companies in free zones can be 100% foreign owned, and that companies in 
mainland are restricted to 49%. The latter demonstrates the major issue to be 
discussed in this paper.  
 
                                                
83 Article 2(2) of the Federal Law no (8) of 2004 states that the location of a “financial free 
zone shall be established by a Federal decree”, and thus the boundaries of the DIFC were 
kept within the federal authorities’ powers and not to the individual emirates as an 
indication of the limited scope that these zones should have, Arab Center for the 
Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 25. 
84 Article 4(5) of the Federal Law no (8) of 2004. 
85 Articles 1, 3 and 7(3) of the Federal Law no (8) of 2004. 
86 Article 8(2) of the Federal Law no. 9 of 2004. 
87 Article 5(A)(1)(a) of Law no (12) of 2004. 
88 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 27; Federal 
Law No. 8 of 2004. 
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3 Foreign Ownership Rights 
3.1 Introduction 
Foreign investment is fundamental for the UAE’s economic growth due to 
the country’s inexpert and small population.89 Major indications are the 
free zones and the fact that no personal or corporate taxes are applicable in 
the country.90 At the same time, the absence of security among foreign 
companies, often related to the 49/51 rule, creates a fear to invest as there 
are no clear exit strategies. According to Mr. Smith, “Foreign ownership 
restrictions have been the greatest single impediment to foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the Gulf region.”91  
This section examines constraints on foreign ownership rights in mainland 
LLCs in the UAE. We will study potential conflict scenarios as well as 
resolutions, where one of the major discussions to be brought up is side 
agreement.92 Additionally, we will review findings in different studies and 
examine case law in respect to side agreements.  
3.2 The Source of Restrictions  
The restrictions on foreign ownership often depend on how ‘strategic’ or 
‘sensitive’ a specific sector is to the country’s economic growth or national 
security. The infrastructure and defense sectors normally have tighter 
restrictions, while the retail sector tend to be more relaxed. Other 
restrictions, such as requiring domestic firms to take a major part in the 
ownership (i.e. joint ventures) are meant to “tilt the distribution” of FDI 
project rents in favor of locals.93 
Restrictions applicable to companies’ structures in mainland UAE, outlined 
in Appendix A, generally prescribe that the principal office must be in the 
UAE; at least two shareholders must own the company; and UAE nationals 
must control at least 51% of the company.94 However, constraints on foreign 
ownership are nothing unique to the UAE. These restrictions are seen all 
over the world, ranging from absolute prohibition to limiting the share of 
foreign ownership.95 For example, the US require their nationals to hold the 
majority of shares in the airlines and shipping industries; Japan requires the 
same in telecommunications, and Iceland bans foreign ownership in the 
                                                
89 Shihab (1997) p 251 f. 
90 Nishimura & Asahi (2011) p 21. 
91 Smith (2010). 
92 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 37-38. 
93 Asiedu and Esfahani (1998) p 647 ff.; Azzam and Rettab (2011) p 2. 
94 Appendix A. 
95 Azzam and Rettab (2011) p 2. 
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energy and fishing industry.96 In developing countries, restrictions are often 
upheld in electricity, telecommunication, transportation and financial 
services.97 For example, in the UAE the telecommunications sector is 
monopolized by the government and divided into two organizations: du and 
Etisalat.98 This is probably an outcome from the fact that these service 
sectors are strongly connected to a country’s economy growth.99  
3.2.1 Favoring Native Citizens 
There is a fear in the UAE that FDI will grow too strong and eliminate 
wealth from the local population. Favoring the native citizens is therefore 
not a surprise action in the UAE. After all, the population makes up less 
than a fifth of the country’s estimated 9.2 million residents and the ambition 
to preserve their heritage is strong.100 Consequently, the UAE is taking 
actions to protect the domestic economy from potentially destabilizing 
capital flows as well as from an increasing foreign competition.101 An 
indication of this is illustrated in the UAE’s federal laws, where 
“Emiratization” (set quotas for UAE Nationals) is required in companies.102 
During 2002, the official unemployment figured among UAE citizens was at 
16% and estimated to rise.103 In response, the Emirates’ rulers initiated the 
Emiratization programme to replace professional expatriate workers with 
national Emiratis. Hence, the programme is dedicated to find meaningful 
and empowering employment for UAE citizens to wane off foreign 
dependency.104  
The lack of national workers, especially in the private sector, leads to 
serious skill and knowledge gaps among UAE citizens, which further 
generates a dependency on foreign know-how.105 This presents a major 
obstacle for the UAE government to accomplish its strategic objectives of a 
more diversified and sustainable economy, as defined in the Dubai Strategic 
Plan 2015,106 and in Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030.107 At the same time, 
several international development circles state that restrictions on FDI are 
unproductive. In fact, many countries scale up their efforts to attract FDI, 
                                                
96 Golub (2003) p 7. 
97 Golub (2003) p 17. 
98 From 1976 to 2006 the Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat) was the 
only telecommunications provider for the UAE. Exceptions were allowed in free zones and 
modern housing developments. In February 2006 the new telephone company and Internet 
Service Provider, du, was established to offer mobile services across the UAE and Internet 
and TV services to some free zone areas, and thus the monopoly became a duopoly, 
Peterson (2007).  
99 Golub (2003) p 25. 
100 World Bank (2013). 
101 Godwin (2006) p 8-9; Azzam and Rettab (2011) p 2. 
102 Emiratization plan (2009-2012).  
103 Godwin (2006) p 9; Stevens (2002).  
104 Williams (2011). 
105 Hermansson (2013). 
106 Dubai Strategic Plan 2015. 
107 Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030.  
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which can be seen from the continuing liberalization of FDI policies.108 For 
example, the authorities in Taiwan Province of China have lifted restrictions 
on direct investment into the mainland. The $50 million ceiling on 
individual projects has been removed and approval for investments of less 
than $20 million is now automatic. In 2002, the authorities also lifted the 
ban on investments in notebook computers, third generation mobile phones 
and consumer electronics products in the mainland.109 
3.2.2 Paradoxical Studies 
Over the past three decades, there have been more measures in developing 
countries to liberalize rather than to restrict inward FDI.110 For example, in 
May 2003, the US President George W Bush proposed amending legislation 
to relax foreign ownership restrictions in US airlines by raising the 
permissible foreign ownership limits of voting stock from 25% to 49%.111 
Although, the resolution did not pass it resulted in the General Accounting 
Office study (GAO study) completed at the request of members of 
Congress.112  
The most interesting outcome from the GAO study concerns domestic 
competition. The study stated that greater access to foreign capital would 
allow US airlines to enhance their domestic competitive position. This 
simply means that having access to additional sources of capital opens more 
avenues to seek capital.113 This makes sense in the UAE, which has a rather 
small population, but also a strategic plan to become one of the worlds most 
important investment hubs. If the UAE seeks major capital investments only 
from domestic sources, they could be eliminated from a large segment of the 
world’s capital markets.114  
It is widely argued that superior productivity of foreign-owned firms over 
domestically owned firms is one of the major benefits of FDI.115 This claim 
refers to the general theory of internationalism confirming that foreign-
owned companies that enter into an unfamiliar economy must be “in 
possession of some ownership specific advantage, such as better product, 
more efficient production/marketing skills or an established brand name.”116 
This would mean that the impact on productivity is positive only if joint 
ventures are unrestricted, indicating that companies limited from foreign 
                                                
108 Asiedu and Esfahani (1998) p 656; Azzam and Rettab (2011) p 2. 
109 UNCTAD (2002). P 58. 
110 Agosin and Machado (2007) p 1235 ff. 
111 The amendment was an element of Vision 100 – the Century of Aviation Reauthorization 
Act, affecting several divisions of aviation support and strategy, GAO-04-34R (2003). 
112 GAO was asked to consider two topics: (1) “current proposals to revise U.S. limits on 
foreign ownership and control, including information on current shareholders and past 
examples of efforts by foreign interests to purchase significant equity in U.S. carriers, and 
(2) whether key analytical issues raised it the GAO’s 1992 report on foreign ownership and 
control remain relevant”, Furlan (2006) p 25. 
113 GAO-04-34R (2003) p 7-8, 29. 
114 Furlan (2006) p 26. 
115 Bellak (2004) p 487 f. 
116 Karpaty (2007) p 242.  
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ownership are less productive.  
From a different perspective, Azzam proves in his research that 
generalizations about the superior performance of foreign-owned firms (i.e. 
the general theory of internationalism) should be taken with cautiousness. 
His research estimates productivity gaps between entities with different 
shares of foreign equity. When comparing firms operating under the 51/49 
rule in the UAE, he finds them just as productive as firms under full foreign 
ownership in the majority of sectors. The most expressive exception is the 
trading sector where foreign owned firms usually provide better results. The 
study concludes that foreign ownership is not necessarily the most important 
determination of productivity gaps between locally owned and foreign 
owned firms in the UAE. It could even be insignificant when also 
considering e.g. sectorial differences, co-existence of free zones and 
customs territory. Great thoughtfulness should therefore be considered 
before sweeping generalizations in favor of amending the 49/51 rule.117  
In addition, a research made by Asiedu and Esfahani shows that ownership 
structure depends on the productivities of the investing transnational 
enterprise’s assets, local entrepreneurs’ capabilities and the host country’s 
infrastructure and institutional setting. They suggest that removing equity 
restrictions may have little effect in the improvement for foreign investment, 
and that a more effective way of attracting foreign investment is to improve 
the country’s physical infrastructure. If the business environment for 
instance is appealing to foreign investors, the host government’s wish to 
retain larger excesses in the country strengthens, and the pressure for local 
equity participation increases.118 
Here we have analysis promoting the removal of restrictions, and others 
encouraging the opposite. Despite in which direction the UAE’s legal 
development will finally lead, there will undoubtedly remain dissatisfaction 
among certain groups. Even though restrictions on FDI are considered 
unproductive according to the general theory of internationalism, there are 
indications that the UAE will be vigilant about opening up the economy to 
foreign investors.  
3.2.3 Shareholders Disagreements 
Disagreements between shareholders are not unusual, not least in regards to 
requirements on a country’s ownership structure. For example, if the 
nominee shareholder (the majority owner) wish to enhance his share of the 
economic interests, or increase his participation in the company’s 
operations.119 To provide a clearer understanding, I have looked into typical 
fractions behind such conflicts, where Sameer Huda (Hadef & Partners)120 
                                                
117 Azzam and Rettab (2011) p 17. 
118 Asiedu and Esfahani (1998) p 659. 
119 Hadef & Partners (2010). 
120 Huda (2013). 
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and Samer Qudah (Al Tamimi & Company)121 have assisted with examples 
of situations.  
One of the most common indications of conflict, according to Huda, appears 
when the UAE shareholder has requested an increase in his or her annual 
“sponsorship fee”.122 In such a case, the UAE shareholder probably wants to 
review the financial statements to find out whether he or she might be 
entitled to a higher cut. Huda further indicates that disagreements are 
common if the UAE shareholder finds out that the foreign investor is 
considering replacing him or her with another shareholder, which could be a 
result from the local partner’s laziness and unwillingness to cooperate.123  
Qudah, meanwhile, refers to a recent case where the majority owner (UAE 
shareholder) unexpectedly passed away. The heirs of the dead owner 
claimed ownership of the 51% shares as well as a share of the profits and 
management rights of the company, which they had rights to according to 
Articles 233, 283 and 22 in the CCL. This situation typically brings conflict 
to the surface, as the foreign owner does not expect a third party to inherit 
these rights nor to become his new partner. Many times, foreign investors 
are not aware of such rules prior to entering a partnership agreement. 
Instead, foreign shareholders are often too attracted by the business friendly 
and tax-free environment offered in the UAE, and thus end up in 
problematic situations that could have been avoidable.124 
Additionally, St Valery at the Links group has stated the following scenario: 
"There have been instances that we have dealt with where a business has 
been successfully built up by a foreign party with no interference from the 
local partner over a three-to four-year period," he says. "Then the local 
partner has come in and said, 'Thank you for running my business, you can 
go now, I am getting another partner.' Literally as quickly as that, because 
the right documentation had not been put in place. If you are cutting corners 
in the beginning, these things can go horribly wrong if you are not well-
protected."125 
Other situations indicating conflicts can additionally be attached to routine 
corporate requirements, for example, renewal of trade licenses or renewal of 
residency visas.126  
In the demonstrated scenarios, we can conclude that the matter of ownership 
structure is constantly present and somewhat outlines the source of each 
conflict; whether it concerns the sponsorship arrangement, the replacement 
                                                
121 Qudah (2013). 
122 In order for a foreign shareholder to even reside in the UAE, a local sponsor must 
provide him or her allowance to register with the authorities. In a corporation’s agreement 
between a national shareholder and a foreign shareholder, the sponsor normally represents 
the local shareholder acting as the employer of the firm, Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs. 
123 Huda (2013). 
124 Qudah (2013). 
125 MEED (2011). 
126 Qudah (2013). 
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of a partner, third parties rights and more. When resolving shareholders 
disagreements, it will correspondingly be a matter of restructuring or 
renegotiating the company’s ownership arrangement.    
3.2.4 Strategies Resolving Disagreements 
According to Hadef & Partners, there are three primary ways to prevent 
conflicts: through friendly settlements, negotiations, or by filing a case with 
the court. 
First and foremost, the foreign investor should focus on establishing and 
maintaining “friendly settlements.” For example, if the foreign investor is 
satisfied in his or her partnership and wishes to continue operating with his 
existing UAE shareholder, the foreign investor should consider to regularly 
renegotiate existing contractual terms. By amending the notarized 
Memorandum and Articles of Association on a regular basis, chances that 
both parties are satisfied with terms and conditions of their contract and 
each other will increase. Another friendly settlement could be to notarize a 
power of attorney where the UAE shareholder bestows execution rights 
upon the foreign partner.127 However, there is a risk that the UAE 
shareholder could cancel such a power of attorney, as the concept of a 
binding power of attorney is not yet recognized under UAE law.128  
Side agreements represent an additional option to reach a friendly 
settlement. It may for example contain provisions where the UAE 
shareholder approves that he did not contribute with financing the share 
capital of the company and thus have no right to claim profits, trade name, 
assets, or other benefits of the company.129 
  
If a friendly settlement is not an option, a dispute can be resolved through 
“negotiation” with the UAE shareholder on mutually agreed lump sum 
compensation. The foreign investor typically does this to encourage the 
local shareholder to transfer his 51% of shares to a new local shareholder.130 
 
In case all friendly and negotiable settlements eventually reaches a dead-
end, the foreign shareholder could consider filing a case with the court to 
request involuntary liquidation. Such liquidation is only possible if the 
company has suffered losses up to at least 75% of its capital, or, if the 
disagreement between shareholders makes it unmanageable to carry out the 
business and thus comply with the company’s objectives.131  
Shareholders disagreement must be managed accurately, preferably not only 
                                                
127 Hadef & Partners. (2010). 
128 The UAE law contains no provisions, like in other legal systems, whereby a party 
contracting with a company in good faith is allowed to assume that the contract is validly 
completed, and thus a person who signs a contract must prove that he is entitled to do 
so, Brawn (2013). 
129 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 38. 
130 Hadef & Partners. (2010). 
131 Articles 281, 289 CCL; Hadef & Partners. (2010).  
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after a dispute has arisen but also preventively. Huda insists that foreign 
investors should appoint a legal advisor when arranging any additional 
contract to the MOA, e.g. if initiating a side agreement. A difficult barrier 
could otherwise be the Arabic language, especially since translation from 
national law normally is necessary.132 According to St Valery, "We have 
had instances where the Arabic text does not concur with the English text. 
When it comes to payment terms, the duration of the agreement, or 
termination clauses, Arabic text will always take precedence in court if there 
is a dispute. Sometimes foreign parties have just read the English text and 
are happy with it, but the fact the terms are completely different on the 
Arabic side has landed them in hot water."133 
Accordingly, disagreements between shareholders may refer to vast 
different situations, but as demonstrated above, they usually origin in the 
ownership structure. Next we will investigate the “friendly settlement”; side 
agreement, which is the arrangement foreign investors typically apply in 
order to avoid the 49/51 rule.134 
3.3 Side Agreeements 
It is not a secret that side agreements represent a crucial structure for many 
foreign investors operating in the UAE. Some unofficial findings indicate 
that around 80% of all LLCs in the UAE have a form of nominee 
arrangement in place.135 Other estimations confirm that up to 85% of the 
foreign owned LLCs in mainland are operating on the basis of the same.136  
Typically the Emirati shareholder prefers to take less responsibility in the 
company and sometimes only acts as the sponsor for the foreign investor 
(against a sponsor fee). Meanwhile, the foreign investor desires to own a 
larger amount of shares and to assume managerial control of the company. 
Consequently, many local partnerships have established side agreements as 
a way of evading the restrictions on foreign ownership. Hence, side 
agreements usually specify that the UAE shareholder is not in fact the real 
owner of 51% share capital.137 Instead, such arrangements limit or remove 
the powers and rights of the national shareholder, leaving the foreign party 
as the ‘real’ owner of the entity in question.138 
As demonstrated by Dark, side agreements usually provide the following 
conditions: 
 
• “Only the foreign shareholder has contributed to the share capital of 
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the company and accordingly owns all the share capital of the 
company. 
• The foreign shareholder is the sole owner of all the assets and the 
trade name of the company and is the actual agent with respect to 
distribution agreements and commercial agencies of the company. 
• The UAE shareholder is the custodian and trustee with regard to the 
51% shares registered in his name. 
• The UAE shareholder will waive/give up any shares held by him in 
the share capital of the company in case of liquidation of the 
company (whether in the form of in kind dividends or public auction 
proceedings or amicably). 
• The entire profits and losses in the company will be earned/borne by 
the foreign shareholder except for an agreed percentage of the net 
profits of the company (agreed percentage). 
• The UAE shareholder will not claim any right to the profits 
generated by the company except for the agreed percentage. 
• The UAE shareholder acts only as the local sponsor for the company 
to obtain and renew the licences, visas and work permits relating to 
the company and its employees. 
• The UAE shareholder is entitled to an annual fixed fee (fixed fee) at 
the beginning of each financial year for acting as the local sponsor 
for the company in addition to the agreed percentage. 
• The UAE shareholder is entitled to 10% interest on undistributed 
amounts of the agreed percentage at the end of the financial year, to 
the extent that the company did not distribute profits in the relevant 
financial year. 
• The foreign shareholder, represented by an individual, is appointed 
as the manager of the company.”139 
3.3.1 Distinguishing Ownership 
The CCL distinguish between registered ownership (requiring the 49/51 
division) and economical/beneficial ownership. The registered ownership of 
shares is explicitly stipulated in the CCL and listed in the MOA of a 
company, whereas the economical/beneficial ownership typically is stated in 
the side agreement, which we know usually provides a larger shareholding 
to the foreign owner.140  
In contrast to the CCL, the Civil Code, which only applies in situations 
where the CCL is silent on a matter of issue,141 does not explicitly 
distinguish between registered ownership and economic/beneficial 
ownership (Article 394). Nowhere does it either require the majority 
ownership in a UAE company to be held by a UAE national.142  
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Article 394, Civil Code: 
(1) If a sham contract is made, the obligees of  the contracting parties, and 
special successors, may, if they are  acting in good faith, rely on the sham 
contract and also rely on the hidden contract, and prove by all means the 
sham nature of  the contract by which they are prejudiced.  
(2) If there is a conflict of interest between the parties concerned and some 
of them rely on the apparent contract and others on the hidden contract, the 
former shall take precedence.  
Article 395, Civil Code: 
If the contracting parties conceal a true contract with an apparent contract, 
the true contract will be the effective one as between the contracting parties 
and a special successor. 
The Civil Code refers to the “true contract” as the binding agreement. As the 
law does not mention if the “true contract” is also the one registered, one 
can assume that the validity of the contract has no impact whether it has 
been registered in the company’s MOA or through a side agreement.  
The question is how the CCL agrees to the binding agreement? Even if 
Article 22 provides that 51% of all shares in an LLC in mainland must be 
dedicated a UAE national,143 it does not explicitly prohibit side agreements. 
In fact, the CCL does not even mention side agreements. What the CCL 
stipulate is the distinction between registered ownership and 
financial/economic ownership:144  
Article 227, CCL: 
”Unless otherwise stipulated in the Memorandum of Association. Profit and 
loss shall be divided equally between shareholders.” 
That said, both the CCL and the Civil Code do not prohibit side agreements. 
The major difference is that the CCL automatically presumes that the 
registered agreement is the valid contract (Article 22), whereas the Civil 
Code does not make a judgment regarding this. This means that side 
agreements have no legal acknowledgement in the CCL. As a result, it could 
be presumable that the Civil Code, which applies in situations where the 
CCL is silent, could justify side agreements by relying on the “true 
contract”? There are currently no reflections on this matter, although if this 
is a way to circumvent the registered ownership (MOA), it is definitely an 
interesting reflection. Later we will find this consideration again in regards 
to Case X.  
With no clear standpoint whether side agreements are valid, the need for 
legislation (e.g. Anti-Fronting Law) is crucial. Until that happens, or if it 
will occur, our guideline will be the courts’ rulings on side agreements. 
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Initially we will pass through three cases from the Dubai Court of Cassation, 
and thereafter a recently ruled case from the Federal Supreme Court, which 
completely turn down the former rulings.   
3.3.2  “True Intent of the Parties”  
These first three cases presented verify that the actual agreement refers to 
the contract with the “true intent of the parties” and that it must be written in 
order to be valid and prioritized in a dispute. In other words, they confirm 
that side agreements are accepted if they are documented and reflect the true 
intent of the parties.145  
In the civil Case No. 2009/211 the Dubai Court of Cassation made an 
important statement in respect to “actual agreements.”146 The court ruled in 
favor of the principal (foreign shareholder) giving him the rights of financial 
interest in nominee shares. In its judgment, the court reflected on the “true 
intent of the parties” on top of the covering (registered) agreement. Mr. 
Khodeir and Mr. Wallman believe “this judgment implicitly gave grounds to 
distinguish between registered ownership and economic/beneficial 
ownership as well as provided the grounds for honoring side agreements,” 
even though it is not inscribed in the UAE Civil Transactions Code. Another 
important consequence of the case is that side agreements must be written 
form to conform to the laws of evidence.147 
The Dubai Court of Cassation again acknowledged the phenomenon “actual 
agreement” in the commercial Case No. 2008/212 of 27 in January 2009. 
The court stressed that the actual agreement must be documented to be fully 
accepted.148 This judgment is in compliance with Article 10 of the CCL. 
According to the Article, unwritten testimonies are prohibited in the case of 
a dispute between a company’s partners trying to demonstrate an 
arrangement contrary to what is exposed in the Articles of Association.149 
The third case to be presented (Case No. 2009/17) excelled from the 
previous two cases. It emphasized the Articles 322 and 323 of the CCL, 
which belong to the “Fronting Restriction Regime”150. Relevant parts of 
Articles 322 and 323 provide sanctions on parties intentionally misleading 
information on the Articles of Association of a company:  
Article 322, CCL:  
"Without prejudice to a more severe punishment prescribed in any other 
law, he shall be imprisoned for a minimum period of three months and a 
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maximum of two years and fined a minimum of ten thousand Dirhams and a 
maximum of one hundred thousand Dirhams and a maximum of one 
hundred thousand Dirhams or by either penalty” 
1. “Any one who willfully enters false information or details inconsistent 
with the provisions of this law in the company memorandum or Articles of 
Association or in any other company documents and so too shall be any one 
who knowingly signs or distributes any such documents.” 
Article 323, CCL:  
“Without prejudice to a more severe punishment prescribed in any other 
law, he shall be punished with a fine of not less that ten thousand Dirhams 
and not more than one hundred thousand Dirhams”  
4. “Any company who violates the provisions concerning the established 
portion of the U.A.E nationals in the company capital share or the manager 
or Chairman of the board of directors therein.” 
Despite these Articles, the judgment once again honored side agreements, 
even after it had recognized the implications of Article 322 and 323 of the 
CCL. The Dubai Court of Cassation ordered the relationship between the 
partners of the company to be governed by the side agreement as the de-
facto company.151 
Even though the aforementioned cases acknowledged side agreements, the 
Supreme Court in its latest judgment (“Case X”) unexpectedly ruled in 
contrast to the Dubai Court of Cassation. 
3.3.3 Supreme Court Rejects Side Agreement 
This case, which got its final judgment by the Supreme Court this year 
(2013), demonstrates a unique position on the issue of proof in respect to 
side agreements. It further highlights the possibility to remove a shareholder 
from the company.152 However, our focus now lays entirely on the issue of 
side agreements, while the concern on removal of a shareholder will be 
discussed in chapter 5.  
A conflict arose in an Abu Dhabi based LLC between a UAE shareholder 
(owning 51% of the shares), an Omani shareholder (owning 24% of the 
shares) and a US company (owning 25%). The UAE shareholder had 
requested approval of his right to 51% of the profits in accordance with the 
registered contract. The Omani shareholder countered and claimed that a 
side agreement had been established whereby the UAE partner and the 
Omani partner each owned 37.5% of the shares and the US Company owned 
25% of the shares.153 
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The Court of First Instance issued the judgment in favor of the UAE partner 
on the basis of the official documents (the MOA). The case was appealed to 
the Federal Court of Appeal, which upheld the lower judgment. When it 
arrived in the Federal Supreme Court, an important issue arose: according to 
the general principle in UAE Evidence law,154 written contracts may only be 
contradicted by written evidence (see Case No. 2008/212). However, 
exceptions are permitted if (1) if the opponent ignores his or her right to 
documentary evidence, or (2) if there is an agreement to defraud the law. If 
the fraud exception applies, the party against whom the fraud was made can 
use all kinds of evidence including testimony of witnesses to prove that the 
official agreement is not an honest side agreement. The Federal Supreme 
Court overruled the lower instances and remanded the case back to the 
Court of Appeal.155  
Lack of evidence made the Court of Appeal dismiss the case once again, i.e. 
the UAE partner was considered the majority shareholder. This was not 
accepted by the Supreme Court, which stated that the Court of Appeal had 
not addressed the side agreement’s crucial clause (Article 20). This Article 
states: “Each of the parties acknowledges that they hold shares equally in 
the company.” This was sufficient evidence that the profits and losses were 
distributed equally and not based on the official 51/49-rule of the UAE 
Company.156 Back to the Court of Appeal (for the third time), sufficient 
evidence could finally prove that the shares were distributed on the basis of 
37.5% to the UAE and Omani partners and 25% to the US Company, and 
the Court of Appeal could finally confirm the existence of the side 
agreements.157 
Unhappy with the judgment, the UAE investor appealed for a third time to 
the Supreme Court, contesting the validity of the side agreement.158 This 
time, the Supreme Court ruled differently and declared that the official 
MOA, registered with the authorities, was the actual agreement governing 
the relationship between the parties. The Supreme Court relied on Articles 
8, 10 and 11 of the CCL and held that all agreements should be in writing, 
notarized and registered in the Companies Commercial Register, in order to 
comply with the requirements of the CCL. It further held that all 
amendments to the company documents (MOA) must be notarized and 
registered in the same manner as the MOA.159  
This ruling took a completely different turn as the requirement on side 
agreements raised radically. The problem with this ruling though is that side 
agreements are not official agreements. They cannot be notarized or 
registered in the Commercial Register and therefore they can never 
overcome the registration requirements.160 In fact, the purpose of the side 
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agreement is that it binds the two concerned parties and is concealed from 
the Commercial Register.161 This purpose will not be achieved if there is a 
requirement to notarize it or file it with the Commercial Register. In 
addition, side agreements include provisions that cannot be notarized or 
accepted by the official authorities, such as the shareholding percentage, 
which is usually different from the official documents.162  
It should further be noted that the judgment did not address the effect of 
Article 395 of the Civil Code stating that, “if the contracting parties conceal 
a true contract with an apparent contract, the true contract will be 
the effective one as between the contracting parties and a 
special successor”, which possibly would have produced a different result if 
addressed. See previous reflection whether the Civil Code possibly could 
cover up for the CCL (3.2.2). 
In the light of above rulings we can conclude that the courts in future cases 
will necessarily not decide that all side agreements are null and void as a 
result from Case X. Each conflict will instead be judged on a case-by-case 
basis,163 which unfortunately leaves side agreements’ validity continuously 
vague.  
The discussion to eliminate side agreements by legislation has been in the 
frontline for several years.164 In 2004, the Federal Council of the UAE tried 
to restrain side agreements by passing the Anti-Fronting Law.165 However, 
pending the completion of a New CCL, which purpose has to relax foreign 
ownership restrictions, has put off a final affirmation of the Anti-Fronting 
Law.166 Consequently, the UAE’s modification of laws in terms of foreign 
ownership structure will probably face a conflicting period while deciding 
in which direction to move. Should the government relax foreign ownership 
rights, or should it stringent it by prohibiting side agreements? What 
happens if both laws become adopted? These are questions that face the 
UAE lawmakers and that we will try to address in the forthcoming sections. 
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4 Relax or Constrain? 
4.1 Legal Development  
Among the UAE’s business-related laws, the existing CCL create a source 
of discouragement in foreign investors. Naturally, these investors have 
always been eager to benefit from UAE’s rapid economic growth, but have, 
at the same time, shown a tendency to hold back or invest with fear due to 
the absence of security that relates to the 49/51 rule.167 This has inhibited 
potential foreign entrepreneurs who are wary of spending millions without 
having transparent exit strategies.168 
Mr. Philip O'Riordan, corporate partner at Clyde & Co, states, "At one level, 
the UAE already has a reputation as being quite investor-friendly. It's the 
Switzerland of the Middle East and since the Arab Spring that position has 
really grown. But it has been apparent for a number of years that both the 
companies law and the existing laws around insolvency have been out of 
date." The Managing Partner at Eversheds Dubai, Mr. Nasser Ali 
Khasawneh continues, "The UAE's old companies law dates back to the 
1980s and there was the desire for a new law that upgrades the legal 
provisions in this regard."169   
The UAE authorities have recognized this issue and thus the New CCL is 
expected to instill confidence in foreign investors to attract new FDI and 
enhance the security for existing foreign investments in the UAE.170 This 
chapter will guide us through the New CCL as well as through the Anti-
Fronting Law, concluding with balancing these legal reforms with the 
country’s interests of national independence. 
4.1.1 The New Companies Law  
Discussions and preparations on the New CCL have been worked on since 
2006,171 but the council of ministers did not approve the draft law until 
2011.172 According to an announcement on 28 May 2013, the Federal 
National Council has also approved it and the New CCL is expected to 
come into full force in the final quarter of 2013. The only thing remaining is 
that the Supreme Council ratifies it and that the President signs it before 
publishing it in the UAE Federal Official Gazette.173  
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Earlier efforts to adjust the CCL have failed despite years of negotiation 
since the economic committees from the different Emirates saw no benefits 
for UAE nationals. As a result, the New CCL is supposed to be more 
advantageous for local citizens. According to the Minister of Economy, Mr. 
Sultan Al Mansouri, the new CCL will include: "some conditions that serve 
the economy of UAE and introduce job opportunities and serve certain 
industries, such as the aluminum sector."174 Nonetheless, the principal 
changes reflected in the New CCL are expected to increase confidence in 
foreign investors and thus attract FDI.175  
The most eagerly anticipated and talked about change in the new law is the 
relaxation of the 49/51 rule on certain categories of company. The new law 
will not eradicate this ration completely, but there will be exemptions on a 
sector-by-sector basis.176 It is not official in which sectors these exceptions 
will be and by what percentage, but according to previous discussions, we 
can presume that strategic’ or ‘sensitive’ sectors to the UAE’s economic 
growth and national security will be restricted (e.g. the oil industry, 
infrastructure and defense sectors).177 Service sectors such as electricity, 
telecommunication, transportation and financial services, are also likely to 
be restricted.178 More relaxed sectors could possibly be connected with 
trading, such as the retail sector.179 However, the changes will not apply on 
joint liability companies or simple commandite companies, where all 
partners are required to be UAE nationals.180 "The full details have not yet 
been released," says Hardeep Plahe, counsel at law firm Linklaters in Dubai. 
"However, I expect the companies law to say that foreigners will continue to 
be limited to owning 49 per cent or less of all UAE incorporated companies, 
except in those cases where the cabinet decides otherwise.”181 
Under the existing CCL, a company must be founded by at least two 
shareholders. The New CCL upholds this, but additionally permits for one 
natural or juridical person to incorporate and own all the shares.182 This will 
apply for LLCs as well as for Private Joint Stock Companies. We have no 
clearance whether this will favor foreign investors or not. In addition, the 
limited number of shareholders in an LLC will increase to 75, which should 
provide companies with greater opportunities to increase capital comparing 
to the current limitation of 50 shareholders.  
The New CCL will furthermore allow shareholders to pledge their shares in 
an LLC to another shareholder or to a third party in accordance with the 
articles of incorporation of the company. The pledge will be deemed valid 
against the company and third parties upon its registration in the 
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Commercial Registry of the relevant authority of each Emirate.183 This will 
provide investors with better flexibility to decide their activity level in a 
company. 
Companies will also be permitted mortgages over the shares of LLCs.184 
The current provisions are rather confusing on this matter and have resulted 
in disagreement amongst legal experts and authorities.185 The New CCL sets 
out the process and require a mortgage to be arranged in an official 
document notarized in agreement with UAE law. As a result, additional 
foreign investors will be able to invest, or increase their current investment.  
All in all, the amendments, still not enshrined in Articles,186 seem to provide 
a friendlier business environment for foreign investors. The draft of the New 
CCL does not change things radically, and it will probably not move as far 
as people have hoped for (as suggested by Mr. Nasser Ali Khasawneh). In 
fact, the result of foreign ownership restrictions has resulted in local actors 
making a lot of money from acting as their sponsors. In response to this, 
local actors have lobbied heavily to keep the existing legislation in their 
favour, as local stakeholders are used to being protected from international 
competition.187 For example, the UAE still has no competition law in force: 
however, the authorities have recently agreed upon a new framework to 
enforce a new competition law. The new law, which reflects many elements 
of EU law and international norms, is planned to be adopted in September 
this year (2013).188  
In terms of side agreements, the New CCL will most likely have an impact 
of easing up and eliminating such arrangements as foreign investors no 
longer, at least in some sectors, will need to circumvent the 49/51 rule. 
However, the proportion to be dedicated foreign investors vis-à-vis the local 
party as well as the division of sectors, is still not official, which means that 
the New CCL’s actual affect on side agreements is unclear. Yet, the UAE 
government finds it very important to reduce side agreements, for instance 
to encourage the “Emiratization programme.” Consequently, the 
aforementioned Anti-Fronting Law has been developed, which leads us to 
our next discussion.189 
4.1.2 The Anti-Fronting Law  
In the previous chapters on side agreements, we stated that the Anti-
Fronting Law seeks to eliminate the use of such provisions. In this chapter 
we will first take a broader look at the purpose of this law, and then discuss 
the findings in regards to eliminate side agreements.  
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While many local partners prefer not to be involved in the foreign 
company’s day-to-day operation (i.e. they act as “sleeping partners”), 
foreign investors desire to have full managerial control of the company.190 
Consequently, side agreements are being carried out and the local UAE 
investor remain with little insight in the foreign management’s business 
dealings as well as little awareness of possible illegal practices.191  
In order to undermine the practice of the so-called sleeping partners, the 
UAE authorities have passed the Anti-Fronting Law (also referred to as the 
Concealment Law192) to indirectly force  local partners to take an active role 
in the businesses.193 After its enactment in 2004, the Concealment Law was 
first postponed until late 2007 and then until late 2009.194 It is still put on 
hold and the uncertainty of it implementation is due to circumstances like 
the New CCL.195  
The key provisions prohibit “fronting” (or concealing) agreements, as 
outlined below:  
Article 1:  
“Concealment: to enable the foreigner – whether natural or juristic person 
– to practice any economic or professional activity that is not permissible 
for him/it to be practiced in accordance with the law and decrees of United 
Arab Emirates, whether for his/its account or in participation with others, 
or to enable him/it to evade all liabilities entailed on him/it.”   
“Concealer: any natural or juristic person that enables the foreigner – 
whether a natural or juristic person – to practice any economic or 
professional activity which is not permissible for him/it to practice within 
United Arab Emirates.”   
“Concealed Person: any foreigner, whether a natural or a juristic person, 
practicing with the assistance of the concealer any economic or 
professional activity that is not permissible for him/it to practice within 
United Arab Emirates.”    
Article 2: 
“It shall not be permissible to cover up any foreigner, whether a natural or 
a juristic person, whether by using the name of the concealer or his permit 
or his commercial register or through any other method, in light of the 
definition of concealment stipulated in Article 1.”196 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When studying Articles 1 and 2, the issue arise if entering a side agreement 
in the context of an LLC is classified as “any economic or professional 
activity, which is not permissible for him/it to practice within United Arab 
Emirates”? For instance, under the 49/51 rule in the CCL, it is permissible 
for foreigners to participate in UAE companies, but it is not clearly defined 
what the foreign partner can or cannot do, neither do the definitions in the 
Concealment Law shed light on this problem. As studied before, the CCL 
does not explicitly prohibit side agreements, i.e. it does not prohibit an 
arrangement not consistent with the 49/51 rule, even though this rule is the 
presumed ownership structure to be followed.  
For example, if a UAE company (LLC) undertakes activities considered to 
fall under the Concealment Law, it can be argued that agreements reflecting 
legitimate commercial arrangements between a foreign party and a local 
company would not constitute a prohibited concealment arrangement. To 
clarify the matter, agreements that are not in accordance with the 49/51 rule 
do not necessarily need to fall under the scope of the Concealment Law, e.g. 
well-documented agreements that reflect a company’s actual ownership 
should not be considered as fronting or concealing agreements (Case No. 
2008/212, No. 2009/211 and No. 2009/17).197 On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court decided in Case X to dismiss side agreements that are not 
notarized or registered, even though they were documented.198 The 
confusing part with this ruling is that we still do not know what the 
requirements are to justify an agreement with a different structure from the 
49/51 rule.  
If the Concealment Law is implemented, it will engage to inhibit 
agreements considered “concealed”. In order to actually constrain such 
arrangements, the law needs to be clearer and describe what concealed 
activities exactly refer to. As it seems today, side agreements do not 
necessarily fall under “any economic or professional activity, which is not 
permissible for him/it to practice within United Arab Emirates” (Article 1). 
If the law will not be identified more precisely, side agreements 
circumventing the 49/51 rule can probably go on being contracted between 
local and foreign shareholders, and we will be back on square one where the 
validity of an agreement will be decided on a case-by-case basis (Case X). 
It is further difficult to imagine that the Concealment Law would take away 
a contract’s obligations, i.e. moral weight, towards the nominee UAE 
shareholders, their respective heirs, and to third parties (e.g. banks, 
creditors, etc.).199 That would just awake a chain of actors growing such 
cases unnecessarily large and expensive to investigate. Most common is 
though that heirs and other third parties are not aware of the existence of 
such arrangements and therefore are not bound by their terms and 
conditions.200 Nevertheless, the heirs have the right to claim ownership of 
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the 51% shares as well as a share of the profits and management rights of 
the company.201  
We can conclude that the Concealment Law is far from ready of becoming 
implemented. It is too ambiguous for judging in which cases should fall 
under Article 1, and there is a moral weight that is not easily ignored. 
Speculations are even indicating that the Concealment Law might be a part 
of the New CCL, hence, that the amendments on CCL could be enough.202 
However, it is crucial for entities aiming to go through with side agreements 
to do so in the light of the Concealment Law, as this will help to avoid 
surprises when, and if, the law will be fully implemented.203 If a company 
falls under this law, that entity will be imposed fines and imprisonment 
penalties. The local as well as the foreign partners would have to pay  fines 
up to AED 100,000 and face deregistration from the commercial register. In 
addition, the foreign investor and his employees can be deported.204  
Having absorbed the Concealment Law as well as the New CCL, the pattern 
seems sharper: the UAE try to increase their influence in the international 
community while foreign entities are awaiting new legislation to ease the 
procedure and security of conducting business in the country. In order to 
provide this legal progression, there must be an established balance between 
the two laws and the UAE’s strategic objectives of a more diversified and 
sustainable economy.205 
4.1.3 Balancing the Legal Development 
In terms of the New CCL, the federal authorities see the relaxation of 
ownership rules as a question of pragmatism rather than of ideology. The 
move is necessary to find a balance between the country’s intentions of 
attracting international capital whilst ensuring a central role for UAE 
nationals in the domestic economy. For instance, business sectors that the 
authorities do not view as strategic to their own economic growth will be 
less legislated. In contrast, sectors such as the oil industry will more or less 
remain entirely under Emirati control.206 This means that foreign ownership 
will be constrained in sectors strategically prioritized by the authorities. 
Ensuring a central role for UAE nationals also goes hand in hand with the 
Concealment Law, which has the intention to force national citizens to take 
larger responsibilities and thus develop know-how and contribute to the 
country. The problem is that no relevant laws, including the Concealment 
Law, justify the prohibition of side agreements that circumvent the 49/51 
rule (Article 1 in the Concealment Law). To cover this cap, the prohibition 
could be implemented in the New CCL. As a result, Article 1 in the 
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Concealment Law could lean its ban directly on the New CCL, and the gap 
would be covered. An easier solution is to install the prohibition directly in 
the Concealment Law. The only thing speaking against the latter is the 
insecurity whether the Concealment Law will ever be adopted.  
Hence, if the Concealment Law and the New CCL are not considered in 
harmony, gaps and barriers may potentially appear. If the Concealment Law 
will not be implemented at all, its objectives should be considered in the 
amended CCL. 
4.1.4 Barriers  
Other barriers that might appear once the New CCL is in place are 
speculated to be sector regulation and the constitutions of individual 
companies.207 Sector regulations are nothing new and already exist in 
several fields, especially within the banking sector. The procedure to 
transform companies’ regulations into new percentages of foreign 
ownership will therefore be demanding in organizations where it has already 
been implemented.208  
According to Hardeep Plahe (Linklaters), "In commercial agency, the law 
permits no foreign ownership, while in insurance, foreign shareholdings are 
limited to 25 per cent"…"The articles of association of some individual 
entities set higher foreign ownership limits.209 For example, the bank 
“Emirates NBD” limits foreign ownership to 5 per cent and it is not alone in 
this. Of course, some businesses may decide that it is in their interest to 
relax these rules." Furthermore, First Gulf Bank announced in November 
2012 it was raising the ceiling on foreigners share ownership to 25% from 
the bank’s former 15% ceiling. During this time, non-Emiratis were holding 
14.03% of the stock (counting 9.05% non-Arabs).210  
Another obstacle for the New CCL could potentially be the Concealment 
Law itself: It would be somewhat foolhardy to implement the Concealment 
Law before implementing the New CCL. If that would occur, several 
foreign companies that are relying on side agreements would need to 
completely reconstruct their ownership structure. Hence, they might have 
reconstructed and invested in a new corporation form, only to satisfy the 
Concealment Law, but later to be legally firm in line with the New CCL. 
Such reconstructions are time consuming, costly and exposed to risk, e.g. 
being unable to produce or operate during a period of time and consequently 
lose customers. It should therefore be crucial for the Concealment Law to be 
implemented after and in accordance with the New CCL, or otherwise, as a 
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part of the New CCL.211 
Eventually, it is critical that the government provides clear guidelines 
confirming that liberalization is definitive and that new rules are not just 
temporary. In respect to the New CCL, the law firm Baker Botts advice that 
uncertainty could be yet another, unnecessary, barrier: "It is unknown 
whether, once the threshold has been increased, it can be lowered again and, 
if so, what is the mechanism for doing so. If the threshold can be easily 
lowered, this would adversely affect the effectiveness of the new law and 
therefore the willingness of companies to rely on it to increase their 
investments in the UAE."212 In other words, there is a risk that foreign 
investors will be dissuaded from investing in the UAE without having full 
commitment that liberalization is definitive. 
Until now, we have learned about the incorporation process of companies in 
the UAE. With a clear focus on LLCs, we have looked into foreign 
ownership structures and thereof restrictions, potential conflicts and 
solutions. We have also discussed the legal developments in respect to side 
agreements and foreign ownership restrictions (i.e. 49/51 rule). Before 
analyzing and making conclusions, another situation is to be examined: the 
possibility to remove a shareholder from a company in which the parties 
have entered a side agreement. 
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5 The Effect on Minorities 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter refers to the previous discussion on shareholders’ disagreement 
(chapter 3). In this section, we will highlight the possibility to remove a 
shareholder from a company as because of shareholders’ disagreement. By 
investigating this question, we will understand to what extent minority 
shareholders are protected by side agreements, and thus what the 
Concealment Law would mean to minority shareholders if it were 
implemented. It is important to know that the withdrawal of a partner has 
not been discussed on a large-scale in the UAE. That is why Case X, as one 
of the very few judgments in this regard, is critical for this discussion. 
For example, if two shareholders of an LLC, have entered a side agreement 
where the foreign shareholder controls 75% and the Emirati partner 25% of 
the shares, then it will be a matter of who holds the majority of the shares in 
case the Emirati partner wants to remove the foreign investor (Articles 37, 
47 and 63 of the CCL). The UAE shareholder will undoubtedly refer to the 
registered ownership, as outlined in the MOA, claiming that he is the 
majority owner, whilst the foreign shareholder will refer to the side 
agreement.213 This leaves us with the fundamental question: which contract 
represents the “actual agreement?” Is it the registered contract (MOA) or the 
side agreement? As we learned from Case X, the appraisal is decided on a 
case-by-case basis.  
5.2 Case X 
This recent judgment (2013) by the Federal Supreme Court, which identifies 
the validity and enforceability of side agreements, also addresses the issue 
on whether the majority shareholder can request the court to remove a 
minority shareholder in the same company.214  
Based on its 51% shareholding majority, the UAE investor requested the 
court to remove the Omani shareholder because the Omani shareholder had 
not been cooperative and as a result caused a loss to the company. The 
Omani shareholder argued that the partners in the company had signed a 
side agreement where the Emirati shareholder and the Omani shareholder 
each owned 37.5 % of the shares, and the American partner 25%. 
The Court of First Instance refused to accept the UAE shareholder’s request 
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on the basis of Articles 37, 47 and 63 of the CCL. These articles require a 
numerical majority, and in this situation only one out of three shareholders 
requested the dismissal. The Court of Appeal consequently upheld this.215  
 
Article 37, CCL 
Unless the Memorandum of Association allows for a majority of votes, 
general partnerships shall adopt resolutions made by unanimous voted the 
partners' unanimous votes, and unless otherwise stipulated in the 
Memorandum of Association, "majority" shall mean numerical majority of 
votes,  
 
Article 47, CCL 
A commandite is a company comprising one or more jointly associated 
partners liable for the company's obligations to the extent of all their assets 
together with one or more silent partner(s) liable for the company's 
obligations only to the extent of their respective shares in the capital,  
 
Article 63, CCL 
Provisions of Article (37) of this Law shall apply to joint ventures. 
The Emirati shareholder appealed to the Federal Supreme Court,216 which 
overturned the rulings of the lower instances and required the “majority” to 
refer to the majority of shares, not to the majority of the partners. The 
Supreme Court stated that only one shareholder owning a majority of the 
shares could request the court to dismiss a partner based on sufficient 
reasons to justify his appeal. As the UAE shareholder, according to the 
registered MOA, owned 51% of the shares, he could appeal the dismissal of 
the Omani shareholder on the basis of the following articles:217    
Article 677, Civil Code: 
(1) It shall be permissible for a majority of the partners to apply for a 
judicial order dismissing any partner if they adduce serious reasons 
justifying the dismissal. 
(2) It shall likewise be permissible for any partner to apply for a judicial 
order that he cease to be a partner in the company if the company is of 
defined duration, and he provides reasonable grounds for such application. 
(3) In both of the foregoing events the provisions of Article 675 (2) shall 
apply to the share of the dismissed or withdrawing partner, and such share 
shall be assessed in accordance with its value on the date the claim was 
brought. 
Article 675 (2) ‘It shall likewise be permissible for an agreement to be made 
to continue the company as between the remainder of the partners if one of 
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them dies or is placed under a legal restriction or becomes bankrupt or 
withdraws, and in those events such partner or his heirs shall be entitled 
only to his share in the assets of the company…’  
In light of the above, the Federal Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
Court of Appeal to consider the directions of the Supreme Court.218 As the 
requirement now was a matter of who held the majority of shares, the 
problem was to decide which agreement that was binding. The only chance 
for the Omani shareholder to avoid being ejected from the company was if 
the side agreement was considered the binding contract.  
As we already clarified when studying this case in chapter 3, the side 
agreement was firstly approved because it was documented (in writing), and 
because all three parties signed it. Article 20 in the side agreement states, 
“Each of the parties acknowledges that they hold shares equally in the 
company.” In addition to other documents, this supported that the profits 
and losses were distributed equally between the two shareholders and not 
based upon the official 51/49 rule.219 But as the case took a different turn in 
the final judgment by the Federal Supreme Court,220 the rights dedicated the 
minority shareholder (the Omani partner) went straight to the UAE 
shareholder. After the Supreme Court’s ruling that the registered contract 
was the one to be considered valid, the UAE partner could account for his 
part of the company in accordance with the 49/51 rule.221 
This final judgment did not address the issue whether the rights of the 
parties under the MOA should be liquidated as a result of the invalid side 
agreement. In other words, we still do not know if the Omani partner will be 
removed from the company, we only know which ownership structure the 
Court decided to rely on.222 What we may conclude; however, is that this 
ruling noticeably causes an insecure environment among foreign investors. 
Not only in regards to the validity of side agreements, but also in respect to 
the affect that one single shareholder may have on minority shareholders. If 
there are no circumventions to the 49/51 rule, foreign investors in LLCs will 
always face the risk to be removed from the company.  
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6 Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
It is clear that the UAE’s economic growth has attracted international 
enterprises to the country. It is also clear that the Emirati jurisdiction, 
providing for instance no corporate tax rate and free zones, is a major reason 
why foreign corporations choose to establish there. However, this rather 
“optimistic” interpretation of being business-friendly towards foreign 
investors is not always realistic.  
The UAE has strict laws in respect to foreign ownership rights if the 
company does not incorporate in a free zone, which has been demonstrated 
in this study and which I am about to analyze further throughout three 
sections: First we will estimate the advantages/disadvantages with side 
agreements to realize whether such arrangements should be recognized in 
the UAE. Afterwards we will analyze the balance between the government’s 
desires to activate local Emiratis in the national economy whilst attracting 
FDI. Lastly, we determine whether the UAE should relax or constrain 
foreign ownership rights based on the relevant legal developments. 
6.2 Recognizing Side Agreements  
Establishing in a free zone will avoid conflicts as the ownership structure 
can be attributed to only one shareholder, whereas companies in mainland 
are required to have at least two.223 As a result, foreign ownership 
restrictions in LLCs often lead to disputes between shareholders. In this 
paper we have looked at different sources of conflict, such as when the 
foreign shareholder wants to exchange his local partner, or when the local 
shareholder, acting as a sleeping partner accordingly with a side agreement, 
suddenly claims the 49/51 structure in order to take control over the 
company’s financing and management.  
Normally when a dispute arises between a foreign and a local shareholder, it 
is related to the company’s ownership structure. If a different structure apart 
from the 49/51 rule has been conducted (i.e. side agreement), the source of 
the problem tend to focus on which agreement that is valid. Thus, as side 
agreements typically provide a larger share to the foreign investor, such 
arrangements noticeably collapse with the CCL’s required 49/51 rule. The 
solution to the problem will therefore be for the courts to investigate which 
ownership structure that a company is built upon (the “true contract”). This 
is supported from case law; where disputes usually result in the argument of 
which contract is valid. The foreign shareholder naturally claims the side 
agreement while the UAE shareholder claims the 49/51 rule. 
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According to Case No. 2008/211, No. 2009/17 and No. 2008/212, 
shareholders may structure their company based on side agreements if they 
are well documented. But since the ruling of Case X (2013), where the 
Supreme Court decided that written evidence is not enough and that side 
agreements must be notarized or registered in the Commercial Register, this 
pattern was suddenly interrupted. As a result, case law conflicts with each 
other, which provides an insecure environment among foreign investors. In 
this sense, the UAE judicial system is flawed, as it does not clearly state 
whether it accepts side agreements or not. In Case X, the Supreme Court 
ruled that side agreements should be judged on a “case-by-case ruling”. By 
stating so, the court has indeed confirmed that they have no sharp position 
towards side agreements: on the one hand, the court concedes it is enough if 
the side agreement is documented, but on the other hand, the court claims 
the side agreement is “null and void” if not notarized or registered.  
Another interesting aspect of Case X is that side agreements are independent 
non-official arrangements that only bind concerned parties. They usually 
include provisions that cannot be accepted by the official authorities (i.e. the 
shareholding percentage), which makes the agreement impossible to 
register. Correspondingly, this creates a rather unserious picture of the 
Federal Supreme Court as the demands are impossible to follow, since side 
agreements are not official agreements and can therefore not be notarized or 
registered in the Commercial Companies Register. If this case would be 
precedential, side agreements would never gain support over the 49/51 rule 
and thus all future cases would already be decided before trial.  
Case X confirms the negative aspect of entering into side agreements as it 
could provide harsh consequences for the foreign investor. Even for foreign 
shareholders who are being accurate by writing, signing and stamping the 
side agreement, it is possible that their actions are not adequate in a court of 
law. Thus, the lesson from this ruling is the importance of being aware of 
the uncertainty with side agreements. Foreign investors who enter such 
agreement with a local shareholder should in advance consider strategies to 
prevent and eliminate disagreements. For example, by regularly 
renegotiating the existing contractual terms to make sure that all parties are 
satisfied, by notarizing a power of attorney where the UAE shareholder 
bestows execution rights upon the foreign partner, or, by reaching a 
settlement through a side agreement, e.g. where the UAE shareholder 
confirms that he or she did not participate in financing the share capital of 
the company and thus have no right to claim profits. However, these 
solutions are not resolving the long-term problematic with side agreements, 
but rather inhibiting disagreements before they arise. 
The positive view on side agreements is that they represent the true 
proportion of a company’s ownership structure between shareholders. 
Therefore, it seems wise, and fair, to contract side agreements in order to 
reflect the “true” division among shares and management in a corporation, 
and rather unfair not to conduct such arrangements if the registered MOA 
does not reflect the actual division of workload, capital and engagement. 
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This conclusion provides that regulation in the field is significant to prevent 
anxiety among international investors and to eliminate the risk of scaring 
away already established companies. The regulation does not necessary 
need to prohibit side agreements, as suggested in the Concealment Law, but 
rather outline a framework and legalize it as an option to the CCL’s 49/51 
rule.  
In fact, implementing the Concealment Law may have a negative approach 
on minority shareholders, as they would be far less protected because of 
such agreements being invalid and always lay behind the local shareholder 
in any dispute referring to ownership structure. In addition, there will most 
likely be situations where the foreign owner contributes more to the 
company than he can ever be legally recognized for. There is also the 
challenge for foreign investors to rely upon UAE nationals taking an active 
responsibility for 51% of the shares, as many local owners presently are not 
accustomed to such engagements as a result of the traditional sponsorship 
arrangements.  
Even if the Concealment Law would be adopted, we will probably continue 
facing side agreements, and shareholders will continue circumventing 
Article 22 of the CCL. As seen in this study, the match between the local 
shareholder and the foreign shareholder seem too beneficial and satisfying 
for both parties to ignore: the foreign investor can assume managerial 
control of the company whilst the Emirati shareholder acts as the sponsor 
(against a sponsor fee). If such side agreements will be prohibited, they 
might still be conducted, but in secrecy. As a result, the surface of a 
company will mirror a company’s structure incorrectly, which further could 
lead to authorities losing control over individual companies by simply 
having a register non-uniform with reality. 
If the Concealment Law will not come into force and side agreements will 
not be invalid, investors should still think carefully before entering such 
arrangements, as these will continue to be judged on a case-by-case basis. 
The right documentation must be put in place, and preferably signed by all 
concerned parties. It is further crucial paying attention to contractual 
differences between languages. When the Arabic text does not concur with 
the English text and there is a dispute in terms of payment terms, the 
duration of the agreement, or termination clauses, the Arabic text always 
take precedence in court. Appointing local legal advice is therefore central 
to eliminate unnecessary language misunderstandings. 
Irrespective of the outcome of the Concealment Law, the adoption of the 
New CCL (end 2013) will most likely reduce side agreements due to the 
relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions in certain sectors. Yet, there will 
always be an interest among shareholders to conduct side agreements in 
other sectors that are not affected by the amendments to the CCL. Therefore, 
the New CCL should not be considered part of a solution at this stage, as we 
still do not know in which sectors a relaxation will be enforced and to what 
extent.  
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In light of the above, we can conclude that side agreements are an impartial 
way of estimating the actual ownership structure. Side agreements are good 
if it keeps all parties satisfied and reflects the true agreement, or at least if it 
is closer the true agreement than the registered one. But we should also 
determine that side agreements are unreliable tools and can affect foreign 
investors negatively (Case X). If side agreements become legally 
recognized, conflicts leaning on the validity of contracts would be less 
confusing. Such arrangements can help the UAE towards economic growth 
by not scaring off foreign corporations from establishing in the country. 
6.3 Nationalized whilst Attracting FDI 
My interpretation is that the debate weather side agreements should be 
illegal is grounded in a fear of being less “Emirati.” By letting control pass 
from the UAE’s citizens to the foreign investors, the country loses control of 
its domestic economy. The government’s desire is to see the country grow 
on its own and not to be dependent on foreign know-how.  
Efforts by the UAE government to motivate the citizens and to increase 
their involvement in the private sector (e.g. the Emiratization programme) 
also include the reduction of side agreements. This forces the UAE nationals 
to take an active role in the private sector since they no longer can be 
sleeping partners to foreign companies. A potential consequence could be 
that Emirati nationals, who are looking for a partner, avoid investing or 
sponsoring foreign entities. Indeed, some of the local firms probably want to 
pertain their registered shareholding within the company, while other local 
firms or UAE nationals prefer being inactive. However the relationship 
turns out, the option should lie on the involved partners. After all, 
circumventing the 49/51 rule must be based on the will of all involved 
parties.  
Although, if there is a desire to reduce national dependence on international 
professionals, UAE’s initiative to activate local citizens is a good course of 
action to diversify the domestic economy. The fact that Emiratis often enter 
the world with no conscience regarding wealth makes it difficult to create a 
hard-working environment without clear guidelines.224 On the other hand, 
the UAE aim to be an international trade and investment hub. From this 
perspective, the country depends on FDI. 
This balance is complicated because the government seeks to relax foreign 
ownership restrictions (the New CCL), and at the same time to restrict side 
agreements that circumvent such constraints (The Concealment Law). There 
is no clear answer when these two fairly connected laws will be adopted, or 
even if both will come into force. Experts are even indicating that the 
Concealment Law might be a part of the New CCL, hence, that the 
amendments on CCL could be enough to cover both laws. Overviewing the 
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Concealment Law’s Article 1 and 2, it does seem far from finalized as the 
prohibition to circumvent the 49/51 rule is not specified. However, it is 
crucial for entities aiming to conduct side agreements to do so in the light of 
the Concealment Law, as this will help to avoid conflicts when, and if, the 
law will be fully implemented.  
A negative consequence of the legal uncertainty is that foreign investors 
might avoid investing in the UAE. For example, if a foreign company that 
seeks to incorporate an LLC in Dubai finds a local investor who is only 
interested in being a sponsor and not to partake in the company’s day-to-day 
operations or invest any capital in the LLC; that company deserves to know 
if entering a side agreement is illegal. If the Concealment Law is 
implemented, side agreements are made illegal and the foreign investor 
would need to find another local investor. If the New CCL was adopted, the 
sector in which the company is licensed to work could possibly allow the 
foreign investor a larger shareholding without the need of issuing a side 
agreement.  
There is also a risk that foreign investors will be dissuaded from investing in 
the UAE without having full commitment that liberalization is definitive, as 
suggested by Baker Botts.225 Therefore, these legal amendments should 
provide a clear standpoint as soon as possible to facilitate the business 
environment.  
The approval of the New CCL will be a major step towards lifting the ban 
on non-Emirati corporate control of firms outside free zones. According to 
the GAO study, it will help the country to attract a wider range of 
international portfolio investors due to an increased confidence in foreign 
financiers. It is further declared that superior productivity of foreign-owned 
firms over locally owned firms is a major benefit of FDI (i.e. the general 
theory of internationalism),226 and that companies limited from foreign 
ownership (e.g. the 49/51 rule) are less productive.  
The natural result from these arguments is that relaxation on foreign 
ownership is good, productive and beneficial. In a broader perspective 
though, it seems as if the matter of restrictions on foreign ownership is 
rather insignificant when also considering e.g. sectorial differences, co-
existence of free zones and customs territory, which is confirmed by Azzam. 
He demonstrates that foreign ownership as such is not necessarily the most 
important determination of productivity gaps between locally owned and 
foreign owned firms in the UAE.227 Asiedu and Esfahani also support this 
by showing that ownership structure depends on the productivities of the 
investing transnational enterprise’s assets, local entrepreneurs’ capabilities 
and the host country’s infrastructure, and thus not only by relaxing foreign 
ownership restrictions as such.228 
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That said, we can determine that mixing foreign and local ownership is 
positive if the company can access otherwise inaccessible local resources, 
but it does not necessarily mean that relaxing foreign ownership restrictions 
will contribute to the country’s goal to attract FDI. The view may also be 
negative if problem arises as a result of the partners’ contributions not being 
fully contractible and thus leads to shareholders disagreements. Finally, we 
can state that the legislation must be clearer and provide a fixed position on 
the issue of foreign ownership rights.  
6.4 Relax Foreign Ownership with Caution 
It can be determined that the New CCL’s positive implications surpass the 
negative aspects. Relaxing ownership restrictions will create confidence in 
foreign investors, which will turn the UAE to an even more attractive 
business hub. By doing so in a sectorial basis, the UAE will be able to 
remain in control over the domestic economy and strategically prioritize 
which sectors to be constrained. Awaiting such legislation would rather 
seem uncompromising towards FDI, despite the aforementioned studies 
suggesting that relaxation on foreign ownership restrictions is inefficient for 
companies’ productivity. 
Nevertheless, the willingness to reduce the dependence on foreign 
knowledge is reasonable from the UAE’s perspective. If the local population 
is not active, as we can understand by the number of agreements opposed to 
the required company structure (80% or more, see chapter 3.3), constraints 
on foreign ownership rights might be necessary. Thus, for the UAE to 
develop local know-how and minimize their international dependency, it is 
crucial with more drastic regulations, for example, to forbid sleeping 
partners. 
From another perspective, side agreements can be established as valuable 
tools for foreign investors, if it keeps all parties satisfied and reflects the 
true agreement. It can further help the UAE towards economic growth by 
not scaring off foreign corporations from establishing inside the country. 
The most obvious obstacle though is that they are not legally recognized. 
Therefore, the Concealment Law should not be implemented. Although, 
there should be regulations acknowledging side agreements, for example as 
an addition to 49/51 rule in the New CCL. 
In case both the New CCL and the Concealment Law are to be 
implemented, it is unwise to adopt the Concealment Law first. For example, 
if a company first is legally forbidden to circumvent the 49/51 rule and later 
allowed to be the majority owner, the first ownership structure is 
unnecessary and result in a company’s loss of time and capital. 
All in all, with respect to the UAE’s infancy and small population, letting 
foreign investors contribute seems as the most beneficial way for the nation 
to achieve its visions. However, since local organizations are resisting the 
 48 
amendments (as used to protection from international competition), the 
authorities will be unwilling to allow amendments in a too large scale and it 
will be a long and time-consuming process. 
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7 Conclusion 
The New CCL will most likely be affecting companies in a step-by-step 
process in respect to the UAE nationals. Nevertheless, relaxing foreign 
ownership rights is a crucial and productive way to optimize and attract a 
wider range of international portfolio investors. However, there is the 
possibility that the New CCL will not be adopted on large foreign firms in 
order not to lose corporations with influence and power from having 
national majority.  
If the Concealment Law comes into force, it is unlikely that the country 
would shut down partnerships and establishments that are relying on foreign 
investment. The key is to inaugurate a suitable set of agreements and create 
a structure in line with the New CCL through a legal practice that does not 
violate other UAE laws. This said, if the Concealment law would be 
implemented, it should be so in accordance with the New CCL. This 
requires an in depth knowledge of local training and customs as well as a 
thorough analysis of court precedents for guidance, given that the UAE is a 
Civil Code regime and not a common law jurisdiction.  
The interpretation of the concealment regime may suggest that foreign 
investors should not enter into side agreements. Although, we believe that 
the prohibition of side agreements is interfering with one of the country’s 
most prominent resources, i.e. foreign investors, giving consideration to the 
economic circumstances and the practical reality supported by available 
legal arguments.  
In light of the above, there should be no adoption of the Anti-fronting Law. 
Focus should lie on the New CCL, providing relaxed ownership structure 
for foreign investors. Side agreement should instead be acknowledged along 
with the 49/51 rule in the New CCL, providing that they are legally 
accepted if certain elements have been achieved. Since studies have 
demonstrated that a company’s productivity is relatively unrelated to its 
foreign equity stake, the reform of the 49/51 rule should be made in sector 
specific areas where productivity will actually make a difference, and not in 
strategic sectors defined as secure and sensitive. 
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Appendix A 
 
Company type Ownership Structure  UAE Nationality 
Requirements 
General 
partnership 
Two or more partners who owe joint and 
unlimited liabilities. Partnership companies are 
confined to UAE nationals only.229  
All the partners. 
Simple limited 
partnership 
 
One or more general partners who owe joint and 
unlimited liabilities & one or more limited 
partners who owe limited liabilities. All general 
partners should be UAE nationals and the 
limited partners may not interfere in 
management functions involving third parties 
even with the approval to do so.230 
All the general 
partners. 
Joint venture 
company / 
joint 
participation 
 
Two or more partners among whom only a 
trading partner owes unlimited liability in 
relation to the counterparty and the other 
partners owe no liabilities. The contract 
regulates rights and obligations of the partners 
and the distribution of profits/losses, which will 
be carried on in the name of one of the partners. 
This contract will neither be registered in the 
commercial register nor is to be declared.231 
UAE Nationals 
should constitute at 
least 51% of the 
capital. 
 
Public joint 
stock company 
 
Ten or more shareholders who owe limited 
liabilities.232 The Public Joint Stock Company 
shall be managed by a Board of Directors.233 
The chairman and majority of the members of 
the Board of Directors must be U.A.E. 
nationals.234  
Shareholders having 
a 51% share or more 
in the capital; the 
majority of the board 
of directors and the 
Chairman of the 
board of directors. 
Private joint 
stock company 
 
Three or more shareholders who owe limited 
liabilities. Shares may not be floated to public 
subscription and founder members are to fully 
subscribe the capital.235 Except the provisions 
concerning public subscription, all provisions 
concerning public joint stock companies applies 
to private joint stock companies.236 CCL further 
permit a joint stock company to be converted to 
a public joint stock company.237 
Shareholders having 
a 51% or more share 
in the capital; 
majority of the 
members in the board 
of directors and the 
Chairman of the 
board of directors. 
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235 Article 215 CCL. 
236 Article 216 CCL. 
237 Article 217 CCL. 
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Limited 
liability 
company 
 
Two to fifty partners who owe limited 
liabilities. 
 
Partners having a 
51% share or more in 
the capital. A 
foreigner can be the 
manager of the 
company. 
Partnership 
limited by 
shares 
 
General partners who owe joint and unlimited 
liabilities & limited partners who owe limited 
liabilities to the extent of their share in the 
partnership. All general partners should be 
holders of the UAE nationality.238 
All the general 
partners. 
 
 
 
Branch or 
representative 
office239 
 
A branch may exercise freely the activities for 
which it is licensed. A representative office can 
only practice promotional business for the 
products and services provided by the parent 
company. 
Service agent must be 
UAE national or a 
company wholly 
owned by UAE 
nationals. 
 
                                                
238 Article 256 CCL. 
239 A foreign branch office remains 100% owned by the international organization. Branch 
offices must employ a local “service agent”, which duties are restricted to providing 
services required by the principal with no right to interfere in the management of the 
branch office. For example, the service agent arrange with entry of residence permits, 
acquiring necessary licenses and facilitating relations and thus transactions with 
authorities. In regards to representative offices, they are even more limited towards which 
activities can be undertaken: only promotion activities of the parent company is allowed, 
Lester and O'Keefe (2011) p 9; Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and 
Integrity (2008) p 43-45. 
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Appendix B 
Free zones in the UAE240 
 
- Masdar City 
- Abu Dhabi Airport Free Zone 
- Khalifa Industrial Zone 
- twofour54 
- Dubai Airport Freezone 
- Dubai Silicon Oasis 
- Jebel Ali Free Zone 
- Dubai Multi Commodities Center 
- Dubai Internet City 
- Dubai Media City 
- Dubai Studio City 
- Dubai Academic City 
- Dubai Knowledge Village 
- Dubai Outsource Zone 
- Enpark 
- Intl Media Production Zone 
- Dubai Biotech Research Park 
- Dubai Auto Zone 
- Gold and Diamond Park 
- Dubai Healthcare City 
- Dubai Intl Financial Center (DIFC): the only free zone in the UAE 
with its own civil, labor and commercial laws. 
- Dubai Logistics City 
- Dubai Maritime City 
- Dubai Flower Centre 
- Intl Humanitarian City 
- Sharjah Airport Free Zone 
- Hamriyah Free Zone 
                                                
240 Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity (2008) p 54. 
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- Ahmed Bin Rashid FZ 
- Ajman Free Zone  
- RAK Free Zone 
- RAK Maritime City 
- Fujairah Free Zone 
- Fujairah Creative City 
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Appendix C 
Mail conversation requesting for Case X’s case number.  
 
Hello Anna, 
  
Thank you for your email. I am not permitted to provide the judgment for confidentiality 
reasons. In most cases I can provide judgments but the client in this case said no. Please see 
the case citations below: 
Appeal Judgments Numbered 539, 540 & 546 of 2009 provides a unique position on the 
issue of side agreements.  The Supreme Court held that the side agreement can be 
established by any means of evidence and allowed the parties to hear testimony of 
witnesses. 
When the Court of Appeal heard witnesses and rejected the claim, the parties appealed 
again to the Supreme Court under Appeals No 199,200 and 201 of 2011 whereby the 
Supreme Court considered the evidence submitted and decided that there was enough 
evidence to prove the existence of the side agreement and subsequently directed the Court 
of Appeal to look into this, after which the Court of Appeal issued its judgment in the 
appeals No 324,336 of 2008 confirming the existence of the side agreement. 
  
The Supreme Court ruled for the third time (Appeals 300 and 301 of 2012)! In this latest 
and unusual judgment, the Supreme Court ruled very differently to the last decision and 
ignored the issue of the side agreement. The Supreme Court relied on Article 8, 10 and 11 
of the Commercial Companies Law (CCL) and held that it was imperative for all 
agreements to be in writing, comply with the requirements of the CCL ( i.e. that the UAE 
national holds the majority of the capital) and that all amendments to the company 
documents (i.e. Memorandum of Association) including the side agreement, must be duly 
notarized. 
  
Kind regards,  
Arabella Zane Anani 
Associate 
Al Tamimi & Company 
Dubai International Financial Centre 
Registered with the DFSA 
www.tamimi.com 
   
From: Anna Wallander [mailto:a.wallander87@gmail.com]  Sent: Tuesday, July 09, 2013 
4:01 PM To: Zane Anani; e.noor@tamimi.com 
Subject: Fwd: Regarding a case 
  
Dear,  
I am a law student from Sweden about to finalize my Master Thesis before graduating from 
law school. I have studied foreign ownership structure in the light of side agreements 
(UAE) and discovered your article where a highly relevant case is being analyzed.  
http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update-magazine/section-6/july-august-1/the-
courts-approach-side-agreements-and-their-enforceability.html 
I would be thrilled if you could possible let me know the case number of that ruling as it 
would be a very good complementary to my study.  
 Moreover, is this article referring to the same case as the aforesaid? 
http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-5/june-issue/supreme-court-
judgment-new-approach-on-the-issue-of-side-agreements.html 
  
I appreciate your help very much! 
Kind Regards,  
Anna Wallander 
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